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Abstract
My research is on the role of identity and norms in economic decision making.
In particular, I focus on the emergence of norms and study how behaviors
which were not originally regulated by norms gradually become entrenched
practices and acquire a normative force. For this purpose, I develop proba-
bilistic models which help illustrate the features of the emergence of norms
in society. This research is accompanied by a family of experimental studies
on the effects of social cues on norms compliance. In my research, I use a
combination of formal and empirical methods and explore the conditions that
make, or do not make, formal models an appropriate tool for describing social
phenomena and suggesting interventions in society. These and related top-
ics have been elaborated in my doctoral thesis, which is an interdisciplinary
work combining different approaches and methodologies to investigate norm-
related behaviors. Each chapter constitutes an autonomous scientific paper
which addresses a different question. The first chapter explores a series of
probabilistic models for the emergence of descriptive norms in society. The
second provides an explanatory framework for descriptive norms, according
to which they originate as a by-product of a Bayesian updating process for
detecting regularities in the natural world. The third chapter offers an ex-
perimental study to delineate a novel taxonomy of normative judgments on
the basis of their insulation from group conditioning. Finally, the fourth
chapter provides a methodological reflection on robustness analysis, as a
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We hereby report you
The story of a journey, undertaken by
One who exploits and two who are exploited
Observe the conduct of these people closely:
Find it estranging even if not very strange
Hard to explain even if it is the costum
Hard to understand even if it is the rule
Observe the smallest action, seeming simple
With mistrust
Inquire if a thing be necessary
Especially if is common
We particularly ask you
When a thing continually occurs
Not on that account to find it natural
Let nothing be called natural
In an age of bloody confusion
Ordered disorder, planned caprice,
And dehumanized humanity, lest all things
Be held unalterable.




The norms we live by are a dynamic entity in our societies. Norms continu-
ously emerge, develop and establish themselves in groups. At times they are
dismissed, only to be adopted again before being substituted with new ones.
Just as with language, the norms of society characterize our culture. When
we act in accordance with them, we communicate who we are and where we
come from.
This study focuses on a distinct set of norms, which are those that emerge
spontaneously from repeated interactions between individuals of the same
group. Each society is filled with myriad norms of this kind. Examples are
conventions, moral norms, social and descriptive norms. Norms of fairness,
trust, greetings codes, dress codes and etiquette, are cases in point. Even
if they are not part of a codified system, these norms distinguish what is
allowed from what is not within a social group. Even if we do not see them,
they regulate many small features of our interactions. Informal norms, to-
gether with those norms that will eventually become part of a written code,
contribute to the construction of our social reality.
Consider this scenario by David Lewis (1969):
Suppose that with practice we could adopt any language in some
wide range. It matters comparatively little to anyone (in the long
run) what language he adopts, so long as he and those around him
adopt the same language and can communicate easily. Each must
choose what language to adopt according to his expectations about
his neighbors’ language: English among English speakers, Welsh
among Welsh speakers, Esperanto among Esperanto speakers, and
so on. (pp. 7-8)
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The philosophical puzzle arising from Lewis’s description is how to decide
which language to adopt in the first place. In principle, I will adopt English
if I expect that the other speaker will adopt English, who in turn will adopt
English if he expects that I will adopt English, which again depends on
whether he expects that I expect that he will adopt English, and so on.
The situation with norms is similar. Once established, the norms of
society convey signals by virtue of mutual agreements between members of
the same group. In this sense, when we interpret the actions of other people
as abiding by or violating norms, we judge them with respect to a set of
mutual expectations. Just as with words, we can name a house, a casa, or
a maison, so in the case of norms it does not matter whether we decide for
X or Y, for example whether to greet each other with handshakes, bows, or
kisses, as long as everybody does the same. In this respect, these norms are
arbitrary in the same way as the words of language are. The question of how
certain norms emerge, when other possible norms are on an equal footing,
will be addressed in the first part of this thesis.
Lewis’s analysis (1969) focused on the notion of social conventions, for
the study of which he employed the conceptual apparatus of rational choice
theory, and was largely influenced by the previous work of Thomas Schelling
(1960). One of the most significant contributions of Lewis and Schelling to
the field was to show the potentials and limitations of game theory when
applied to social ontology. As both authors made clear, game theory is
a powerful tool with which to represent interactive decision problems. But
game theory alone is inadequate, if not supported by an analysis of the actual
mechanisms regulating individuals’ decision-making in interactive contexts.
As a response to this critique, an interdisciplinary research program
has been started which combines rational choice theory with the study of
decision-making processes coming from cognitive and social psychology. The
analysis of conventions has since been extended to other kinds of norms, i.e.
social norms, moral norms, descriptive norms, etc. In this area of research,
the criteria for differentiating between different kinds of norms are still a mat-
ter of dispute and the second part of this thesis will present an experimental
study that advances a new criterion for norm taxonomy.
Overall, it is the purpose of this thesis to contribute to a research agenda
whose main motivation is to remedy the several flaws of a theoretical app-
roach to interactive decision-making, which sees the homo economicus as the
standard against which to measure the canons of human rationality. In order
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to avoid the shortcomings of a rational choice approach to the study of norm
compliance, the studies presented in this work attempt to combine in a uni-
fied picture an analysis of human cognition and a theory of action underlying
individual decision-making in group contexts.
To this end, in the course of my PhD I have explored the processes that
lead to the emergence of norms and their compliance using different method-
ologies, i.e. formal models, simulations, and experiments. When giving talks
to present my work, I have often been asked to clarify how this study differs
from related works in sociology, psychology or economics. In other words,
why is this topic the subject of a philosophical investigation? On my side,
I have found solid philosophical support. I could answer the question in the
way Popper did in The Logic of Scientific Discovery : “I do not care what
methods a philosopher (or anybody else) may use so long as he has an in-
teresting problem, and so long as he is sincerely trying to solve it.” (Popper
1959, p. XX). Additionally, I consider this to be a subject of a genuine philo-
sophical nature. As will appear from the following pages, the questions I
address in this thesis combine two aspects which constitute a philosophical
inquiry, namely ethical analysis and scientific research.
For one thing, the process that leads to the emergence of norms is reg-
ulated by inner mechanisms that need to be elucidated. The norms I am
interested in are not the result of the decisions of authorities or policy mak-
ers, but are the outcome of unplanned, bottom-up processes with their own
evolutionary paths. For another, unveiling the conditions behind the adop-
tion of new norms is of primary relevance to actual society. A deeper under-
standing of the dynamics of change in norms could facilitate the integration
process between cultures with conflicting sets of norms. Furthermore, it
could indicate how to accelerate the decay of inefficient or negative norms,
such as discriminatory norms, unhealthy conduct, or unsustainable behaviors
and, at the same time, guide the introduction of positive ones, for example
environmental or public-health policies.
Overall, this work attempts to clarify controversial philosophical issues
related to the emergence of norms and norm compliance. However, I ac-
knowledge that the methods I adopt for this analysis are not mainstream
in philosophy, as they are not restricted to conceptual analysis, thought ex-
periments, and case studies. In this respect, I value the increasing tendency
towards a scientific approach to philosophy, which I also endorse by em-
ploying formal and experimental methods for the solution of philosophical
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problems.
As will appear, the questions I address are apt to be considered within a
broader methodological framework rather than a purely analytical one. At
the same time, translating conceptual problems into models and experiments
opens a number of methodological issues that are as crucial as the questions
for which these tools were originally adopted. With these issues in mind, the
third part of this thesis will be dedicated to a methodological reflection on
robustness analysis, which is a method of comparing the results of a set of
several experiments and/or theoretical models that have been formulated to
investigate the same class of phenomena.
This thesis consists of three parts. In the first part, I focus on a specific
set of norms, namely descriptive norms. Classical examples of the sort are
fashion, fads and trends. In the second part, I investigate the distinction
between different kinds of norms, i.e. moral, social and decency norms. In
the third part, I consider some methodological questions related to robustness
analysis. The subject matter of each section can be expressed in the form of
a question:
• How do descriptive norms emerge?
• How do we selectively distinguish between moral, social and decency
norms?
• What are the assumptions underlying robustness analysis, as a method
of non-empirical confirmation of scientific theories?
In the remaining part of this introduction, I will briefly present the content
of each section in the methodological context in which it is explored.
Topic and Methods
The Formal Approach: Two Studies on the Emergence
of Norms
The study of social phenomena through models and simulations has its ori-
gin in the seminal work of Thomas Schelling on racial segregation (1971).
Schelling studied how macro-phenomena can emerge as the unintended ef-
fect of the combination of many individual decisions. The novelty of this
approach lies in the fact that Schelling investigated social phenomena not
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by looking directly at their macro-variables, but explained them as the un-
planned consequences of aggregated individual interactions. Racial sorting
is a case in point. Schelling’s model shows that segregation occurs not as a
consequence of the preferences of the individuals for segregation itself, but as
the indirect effect of the preference of individuals for having a few neighbors
of the same ethnic group.
Schelling represented the segregation process by means of a checkerboard,
with dimes and pennies, standing respectively for a certain metropolitan area
and for the individuals of two different groups. This is why Schelling’s model
is an example of a paper and pencil model. On the checkerboard, it is possible
to trace the movements of the individuals, and to observe how the config-
uration of the neighborhood changes as a consequence of the individuals’
decisions to move to areas where they will have some neighbors of the same
group.
If the same model were implemented in a computer simulation, then it
would be an instance of an agent-based model.1 Agent-based models, such
as those I have developed in the second and third chapter of this work, are
a class of computational models that study the dynamic of interactive sys-
tems. By relying extensively on computer simulations, agent-based models
considerably increase the predictive power of traditional models: they make it
possible to analyze phenomena involving a large number of factors and their
aggregated effect, thereby overcoming the problem of analytic tractability of
non-simulated models. Through them, we can formulate hypotheses based
on fewer idealizations and whose degree of proximity to the target system is
higher than it would be without such simulating devices. Because of their
computational power, agent-based models have become an indispensable re-
search tool across disciplines, and nowadays they are not exclusively em-
ployed in the social and behavioral sciences, but also in economics, biology,
ecology, epidemiology, etc.
As an illustration, let us consider a simplified reconstruction of an agent-
based model for a social phenomenon. The premise is to build a model which
captures the relevant variables of the individual decisions, such as personal
preferences, response to other agents’ behavior, and to the context. Next, a
way has to be found to implement the model and the other components that
1Notice, however, that there is not a difference in principle between paper-and-pencil
models and computational models: they are both instantiations of a universal Turing
machine, even if usually only the latter require extensive computational resources.
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characterize the system – such as the network structure – into a computer
code. Call the set of relevant factors that are external to the model its envi-
ronment. Together, the model and the environment constitute the algorithm
which runs on the computer. Each run of the program corresponds to a step
of the simulation, which in turns represents a change in the system. The
evolution of the system can be represented graphically by means of software
that transforms the numerical analysis into visual representations.
The procedure outlined above is the one I have followed to build two
agent-based models for the emergence of norms. Whereas Schelling’s model
describes segregation as the consequence of the preference of individuals for
having a percentage of similar neighbors, I consider how the preferences of
the individuals and their interactions are conducive to a norm’s emergence.
More specifically, I am interested in how individual decisions, which result
from a combination of personal preferences, expectations about other people’s
behavior, and social influence, aggregate and give rise to norms. To do so, I
have been working on a set of probabilistic models to answer the question:
how do behaviors, which were not originally regulated by norms, gradually
become entrenched practices and acquire a normative force?2
In the first study, I represent the individual decision to follow a norm
as the outcome of an heuristic process; in the second, as the outcome of a
Bayesian deliberation. In both cases, I focus on the emergence of a specific
set of norms, namely descriptive norms. These are rules of behaviors mainly
driven by a combination of individual attitudes and the desire to conform.
They involve only one level of expectations, i.e. what we expect other people
will do in similar circumstances. Other norms, such as social norms, also
involve beliefs concerning what we think other people expect us to do. The
study of descriptive norms constitutes the starting point of an analysis that
in the future will be extended to norms that involve higher level expectations.
In the second chapter of this thesis, my co-authors and I use a standing
2The literature on decision-making processes mediated by norms, conventions and
the like has –as its starting point– the foundation of morality and the central is-ought-
question. However, in its development it has also radically departed from the meta-ethics
aspects of the problem. In the rest of the text, when we talk about normativity, we
refer to normative expectations, namely the beliefs about what other people expect us
to do. When we talk about certain behaviors acquiring normative force, we refer to the
set of mutual expectations that progressively become regulative in interactive decision-
making processes. Overall, the purpose of this area of enquiry is to analyze how certain
aspects, such as the context or the framing, affect our perceptions of what is normative
and influence our choices accordingly.
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ovation effect as a metaphor for the emergence of descriptive norms. Stand-
ing ovations often occur after theater plays or sports competitions, when the
spectators in the audience progressively stand up to express their appreci-
ation of the performance. The rationale behind the modeling trick is that
descriptive norms resemble the character of a standing ovation, insofar as
they are both contagious effects deriving from idiosyncratic preferences and
group influence. As the second chapter shows, with just a few modifications
of the baseline model, it is possible to apply the standing ovation analysis to
the case of descriptive norms.
Whereas the first model presents a cognitively realistic mechanism for
norms emergence, the second provides a rational reconstruction of individual
decision-making. More specifically, in the case of the Bayesian model, the
members of a group act as Bayesian updaters: they start with certain priors
about the desirability of a norm, which they revise after having considered
the external evidence, i.e. whether or not other agents follow the same be-
havior. The reliability of other individuals is calculated by the likelihood
ratio, exactly the same way as, for example, the reliability of a diagnostic
test is calculated in clinical trials. Individuals formulate the posteriors; and
the higher the posteriors are, the higher the probability that they will follow
the norm.
This way of proceeding shows how the basic reasoning process of Bayesian
updating can be transformed, with just a few modifications of its mathemat-
ical machinery, into a mechanism of social rule discovery. The success of
Bayesian belief revision in dealing with the natural world provides a reason
why we might find individuals naturally extending this apparatus to the so-
cial world. When this decisional problem is implemented in an agent-based
model, we can observe the conditions under which a new norm becomes es-
tablished in a group, as more and more people comply with it, and the speed
of convergence on that norm. The results of the Bayesian model can then
be compared with those of the heuristic one, and the robustness of their
predictions analyzed.
The foregoing examples illustrate what I take to be the proper method
of approaching this kind of research. The starting point is the translation
of a decisional rule into a mathematical model, whose predictions can be
observed by means of formal analysis and computer simulations. The model’s
predictions can be tested afterwards by means of laboratory experiments,
which in turn can provide feedback about the normative model.
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The Experimental Approach: A Study on Group Con-
ditioning of Normative Judgment
The second part of this thesis presents the results of an experimental study on
norm compliance. The topic and the methods employed make it an example
of a work in experimental philosophy, a field of study which sees philosoph-
ical investigation directly involved in empirical research. Traditionally, the
empirical sciences have been the subject of philosophical study, albeit mainly
in an a priori fashion. Philosophers of science look at a variety of aspects
of science, i.e at notions such as explanation, prediction and causation; or
at different criteria of theory confirmation, the validity of specific research
methods and the results to which they are conducive. This sort of analysis,
however, constitutes a theoretical approach to the scientific enterprise.
In tandem with the traditional approach, recently there has been a philo-
sophical shift in attitudes to experimental research, according to which obser-
vational evidence should constitute the raw material that informs philosoph-
ical knowledge. This tendency has been of interest to philosophers working
in several different areas of their own discipline, from the philosophy of lan-
guage to the philosophy of psychology, to logic, decision theory etc. My
research has focused specifically on moral psychology, a field of study which
addresses questions in ethics, not only via conceptual analysis, but also by
evaluating individual responses to morally-loaded situations. Broadly speak-
ing, moral psychology explores questions such as whether we can talk about
a ‘moral sense’, and if so, how it evolved; it investigates and compares peo-
ple’s normative intuitions, asks how automatic emotional reactions combine
with higher-level information related to normative reasoning, and seeks the
neural correlates of normative judgments (Greene et al. 2004; Haidt 2001;
Prinz 2006). To address these and related issues, data are gathered from
behavioral, cognitive and neuroscientific studies.
Within this methodological framework, I have carried out a family of
experiments, together with an ethicist and a statistician based at Tilburg
University, to collect behavioral data on the criteria that individuals adopt
to distinguish between different kinds of normative judgments.
In ethics, normative judgments are those related to ‘ought to’ statements.
From a purely theoretical point of view, if normative judgments express what
‘ought to be done’, it is immaterial whether the content of the prescriptions
refers to moral norms, involving principles of justice and welfare, or to social
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norms, involving principles of fairness which might change across contexts.
However, it is also evident that we judge differently the violation of a norm,
as for example stealing, and that of a dress code, such as wearing pink at
a funeral. In the literature of normative judgments, the criteria for distin-
guishing between different kinds of norms have been investigated, but the
existing accounts have so far failed to identify a consistent taxonomy (Kelly
et al. 2007; Nichols 2002; Sousa et al. 2009; Turiel 1983).
The study presented in the fourth chapter of this thesis investigates
whether a novel classification of norms can be based on their degree of de-
pendence on other people’s beliefs and preferences. In other words, we ask
whether a distinction can be drawn between different kinds of normative
judgments on the basis of their sensitivity to peers’ opinions.. Overall, the
aim of this work is to make progress both in understanding which features
allow our minds to distinguish selectively between different kinds of norms,
and more specifically how social cues impact normative judgments.
The experimental setup we adopted is a modification of the Asch paradigm
(1951, 1955). Asch examined the effects of conformity in a group of subjects
exposed to a visual perceptual task. The task simply consisted of matching
different lines according to their length. Despite the easiness of the task,
Asch showed that when the experimental subjects were in a group of confed-
erates all giving the same wrong answer, they tended to align to the uniform
wrong answer. In our study, we replicate the Asch experiment in the moral
domain. A pool of experimental subjects were recruited to take part into an
experimental setup consisting of two parts: first, subjects were asked to fill in
anonymously a survey with several short scenarios representing the violation
of different kinds of norms, namely moral, social and decency norms. Fol-
lowing this, the same subjects were called into a university office and asked
to evaluate the same scenarios in the presence of a group of confederates.
Unbeknown to the real subjects, the confederates were previously trained to
provide different answers from those given by the subjects in the individual
questionnaire. The experimental findings will be presented at length in the
fourth chapter. In a nutshell, they indicate that the degree of conformity dif-
fers according to the type of norms at issue. Interestingly, the results showed
that moral norms are subject to conformity, especially in situations with a
high degree of social presence.
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On Robustness Analysis
The last chapter of this thesis presents a methodological reflection on ro-
bustness analysis, which is a method of studing a certain class of phenom-
ena through different experimental or theoretical methods, and discusses its
philosophical significance. The idea behind robustness analysis can be illus-
trated by means of a simple example. Suppose you had two different watches
and that, just before leaving to go to a meeting, you checked the time on
both of them. If the time displayed is the same, then the confidence that the
watches are functioning properly is higher than if they were not, in which
case other evidence should be taken into account. Analogously, robustness
analysis in science is a method of ascertaining the accuracy of result via
multi-modal verification.
In the experimental sciences, robustness analysis is a method of testing
the effect of possible confounders on empirical results. Given that experimen-
tal settings are simplified representations of real-world situations, then it is a
necessary preliminary to check whether their results do not depend on one of
these simplifications. Similarly, robustness analysis in the non-experimental
sciences is a method of testing whether the predictions of the model are
the unintended effect of certain specific theoretical assumptions. Given that
scientific models are based on abstractions and idealizations, which do not
literally mirror the target system, a test of robustness proceeds by changing
some of the unrealistic assumptions to check whether the same result holds
true across conditions.
Intuitively, robustness analysis strikes one as a plausible method of in-
quiry. Still, a number of skeptical arguments have been raised against its
confirmatory value. The aim of the final chapter of this thesis is to present
the main positions of the debate and to investigate the assumptions be-
hind robustness analysis in theoretical modeling.The motivation behind this
study stems from the fact that an appeal to robustness will repeatedly be
made throughout this thesis. Different models for the emergence of norms
will be presented and the importance of their robustness highlighted. Sim-
ilarly, the results of a family of experiments on norms compliance will be
discussed, where the idea underlying the variations in the setup is that of
adding progressively to an ordered sequence of investigations. Overall, ro-
bustness analysis is inherent in the process of model building and designing
experiments. Considerable literature has been published on experimental ro-
Chapter 1. Introduction 13
bustness (Stegenga 2009; Soler 2012), there is a lively ongoing debate on the
status of theoretical robustness analysis (Kuorikoski et al. 2010; Odenbaugh
and Alexandrova 2011; Woodward 2006). In an attempt to clarify the no-
tion, a general distinction will be explored between robustness analysis as a
method of testing the role of different assumptions about the system being
investigated, and as a method of testing the role of the assumptions intro-
duced into a model for reasons of mathematical tractability. I will defend the
claim that the comparison of the results coming from models based on dif-
ferent assumptions is in principle helpful, but that the method of conducting
this sort of analysis is far from straightforward.
As I will explain in more detail, robustness analysis has become an um-
brella term that covers different meanings. Drawing on a distinction sug-
gested by Weisberg and Reisman (2008), I refer to parameter, structural or
representational robustness, depending on the object subjected to variation
in the model. In accordance with this classification, a test of robustness is
made in the second chapter by modifying the parameters of the model and
its structure. There, we start from a baseline model, i.e. a very simplified
representation of the phenomenon under study, and progressively add more
and more realistic elements to its structure. In the third chapter, we address
the problem of the emergence of norms within a formal epistemology frame-
work, that helps to motivate the assumptions made in heuristic models. The
idea behind an heuristic and a rational model is that of focusing on differ-
ent aspects of the problem under consideration. Whereas an heuristic model
can take into account the psychological mechanisms of norm compliance, a
domain-general model of belief revision helps explain the disposition to look
for the regularities that generate descriptive norms at the outset.
Despite the advantages of robustness analysis in the studies presented
above, I will argue that opportunities for conducting this practice are of-
ten limited. This means that robustness analysis is by necessity confined
to models whose structure is relatively simple and whose predictions can
been compared with one another. As I will explain throughout the chapter,
however, this is not always the case in science, especially with models with
a particularly complex structure, as for example in economics. I will indi-
cate some of the difficulties encountered in the practice and suggest possible
alternatives, focusing on a case study in economic geography.
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Chapter 2
On the emergence of
descriptive norms
Descriptive norms hide in plain sight.1 While we may not always think of
them, they govern many of our day-to-day interactions: they help guide our
fashion choices, our table manners, the colors we wear at weddings, and any
number of other small features of our social interactions. This governance
can become evident when we travel: many of our small-scale behaviors and
interactions are culturally contingent. Americans typically greet each other
with handshakes. Many continental Europeans greet each other with kisses to
the cheek – but the number varies between countries. Standards for personal
space vary across cultures. It would be difficult to argue that any one of these
practices is ‘right’ – descriptive norms do not carry the normative weight of
social or moral norms – but we all follow the norms from our own cultural
context, and imitate the behavior of our peers. While this may provide a
satisfactory account of how descriptive norms operate, it does not tell us
about how they came to be. What is it about a given norm that caused
everyone to start following it?
To begin to answer this question, we will turn to a simple case, that of the
standing ovation. Standing ovations, like many other descriptive norms, are
the result of spontaneous coordination of individual choices across many indi-
viduals. They have become a common practice after many live performances,
even though there is no pre-arranged plan or even any formal coordination.
All individuals can do is decide whether or not they wish to stand, based on
1This chapter is based on Muldoon, Lisciandra, Bicchieri, Hartmann and Sprenger
(forthcoming).
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their own preferences, and what they see others doing around them (Miller
and Page 2004). Put slightly more formally, most agents have preferences
about whether or not they like to stand up, which depend on the quality of
the concert. They know that standing to clap is a common option after a
performance, and they have (conditional) preferences for standing up if the
other agents stand up, too. This exemplifies a descriptive norm: the agents
know that there is a behavioral pattern (standing to clap) that applies to
the situation they are in, and they prefer to conform with the group (Bic-
chieri 2006, 31-32). In other words, their behavior is not only determined
by unconditional preferences for certain actions, but also by their desire to
conditionally conform to the behavior of a sufficiently large group.
Standing ovations are a useful stand-in for describing societal transitions
to a wide variety of descriptive norms. That is, there is a status quo be-
havior that can be upended by an alternative. For example, fashion often
works in this way. Prior to mini skirts, women wore longer-length skirts, and
upon their introduction, the population largely shifted to a mini-skirt norm.
Movements in popular music also follow a similar pattern: teenagers largely
coalesce around a few bands or a particular kind of music for a few years, be-
fore giving way to a new set of music. Calling etiquette has similarly shifted
as email has become a more common form of communication. What we find
in all of these cases is a status quo that, without any central coordination,
loses out to a new behavioral rule. By focusing on a standing ovation model
as an exemplar of this wider set of phenomena, we can avoid the problem
of getting lost in small case-specific details, and instead try and identify the
key features of individual decision-making that can affect the emergence of a
norm. Thus, we aim to examine how ovations might arise, and in doing so,
come to a more general account of the emergence of descriptive norms in a
population.
To provide for this more general account, we investigate several features
of individual decisions, such as a desire to conform, one’s knowledge of what
others are doing, and one’s own preferences. These elements can affect the
emergence of a descriptive norm in a group and influence some aspects of
the processes, such as whether the group converges on a single behavior, and
if it does, how quickly this happens. Our model allows us to carefully ex-
plore the key aspects of individual decision-making that drive these collective
behaviors.
One additional fact that we wanted to take into consideration was that
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though descriptive norms can be built out of many small decisions, they do
not always emerge. While many of our day-to-day activities are governed by
norms, not all of them are. Plenty of our actions are different. We do not all
walk in lock-step. Further, many of our seemingly coordinated actions can be
simply described as behavioral regularities – agents act purely in accordance
with their intrinsic preferences, which just happen to align with others’.
Descriptive norms, on the other hand, arise when the desire to conform to
the behavior of others overwhelms one’s initial preferences. Our model helps
us to explore the contingent nature of many descriptive norms. What this
model suggests is that it is possible that some descriptive norms become
descriptive norms for no particular reason other than the peculiarities of the
individuals in the population.
In this study we explore four main models:
1. In the first model, the baseline, we build a model for a standing ovation,
which considers an individual’s decision about whether she will stand
to be a combination of her personal unconditional preference and her
tendencies to choose to conform to the behavior of others.
2. In the second model, the inertia model, we introduce two new features of
individual decision-making: first, a tendency of individuals to become
increasingly set in their ways as time goes on, and second, a more
nuanced model of social contagion, to better match how bandwagon
effects occur.
3. In the third model, the endogenous social sensitivity model, we treat
one’s sensitivity to the behavior of others not as something separate
from one’s individual preferences, but as dependent on them.
4. In the fourth model, the symmetric model, we consider a reversible case,
where each agent can decide whether to stand up or to sit down in any
round. We assume that the population is made by two agent-types with
opposite preferences. This setting allows us to compare the emergence
of descriptive norms, where all individuals set on the same action re-
gardless of their own preferences, and behavioral regularities, where all
individuals continue to follow their intrinsic preferences despite other
peoples’ actions.
Each model helps us learn more about the nature of social decision-making.
The first three models explore the robustness of the standing ovation app-
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roach as an explanation of directed norm emergence. These three models
together allow a more nuanced view of social effects on individual decision
making than just the baseline standing ovation model would allow. By exam-
ining more decision procedures, we are able to better describe a larger class of
directed norm transitions than we would otherwise be able to. Being able to
look at information asymmetries between agents further allows us to examine
the effects of social hierarchies on norm emergence. The fourth model that
we consider widens the scope of our investigation into norm emergence by ex-
amining a symmetric case that allows for norm emergence in either direction,
or none at all. Here we are able to more fully investigate the conditions for
when norms do not emerge, since the model allows us to compare behavioral
regularities from descriptive norms, as we can directly inspect agent prefer-
ences. Unlike Lewis’s approach to the analysis of conventions, according to
which conventions are solutions to coordination games where ‘each wants to
conform conditionally upon conformity by others’ (Lewis 1969), we focus on
the decisions of agents who do not reason about other agents’ expectations,
and on norms that themselves have no intrinsic coordination advantages. We
are interested in studying the dynamics created by individuals who have both
intrinsic preferences to act and some interest in conformity. This allows us
to focus on a wider range of more common descriptive norms, many of which
end up having large cultural variation. While much of this analysis could ap-
ply to Lewis-conventions, we examine a less structured environment. In the
family of models we consider, not only do we allow for agents to have interests
beyond pure coordination, we allow for asymmetries between agents across
several dimensions, and consider both complete and incomplete information
conditions.
Together, these models provide a more general account of descriptive
norm emergence than has been seen so far in the existing literature. First,
by focusing on norms that have no inherent differences in utility, we can
focus on the large class of under-studied everyday norms, such as norms of
personal space, etiquette, dress, eye contact, and other small-bore issues.
These norms, when put together, help explain a large portion of our social
behavior, even if any individual norm has only a small effect. Second, by
introducing information asymmetries between agents, we begin an analysis
of the effects of social hierarchies on norm dynamics. Third, by splitting our
study of norms into the directed and bidirectional cases, we can then study
the differences between behavioral regularities and descriptive norms, which
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can otherwise get lumped together in other literature.
2.1 The Baseline Model
2.1.1 Model Description
Let there be M people in the audience of a theater play. The variable s
(n)
i
with i = 1, . . . ,M indicates whether person i is sitting (s
(n)
i = 0) or standing
(s
(n)
i = 1) at time-step (‘round’) n = 0, 1, . . . . Time is discretized and at
n = 0, everybody is seated. Everybody who is not yet standing ‘updates’
her position in each round. Our central idea is that whether or not a per-
son stands up depends on her effective propensity to do so. The effective
propensity of person i is the convex combination of two factors:
1. An intrinsic preference qi to stand up. This represents an individual’s
preference to stand up or not, independently of what other people are
doing.
2. An extrinsic propensity to stand up. This factor takes into account
what other people in the audience are doing. So whether or not some-
one stands up in round n will depend on how many people S(n−1) :=∑M
i=1 s
(n−1)
i were standing up at round n− 1. Note that S(0) = 0.
Combining these two factors, we arrive at the following expression for the








+ (1− σi) qi (2.1)
We see that the variable σi ∈ (0, 1) measures how much person i takes the
extrinsic propensity, i.e. social considerations into account. It determines the
relative weight of intrinsic and extrinsic propensity. Therefore, we say that σi
measures the social sensitivity of person i. Let’s call the model in equation
(2.1) the baseline model. In each round n, everybody who is still sitting
considers her propensity P
(n)
i and then decides, by a chance mechanism,
whether or not to stand up.
Under the conditions of this model, the Borel-Cantelli Lemma implies
that the number of standing people will converge to 1, as n goes to infinity.2
2This is easily demonstrated for any single agent i as follows: In each round k, P
(k)
i ≥
(1−σi) qi. Thus, the probability that the agent will remain seated after n rounds is lesser
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But in practice, only a finite number of rounds will be played, and if the σis
are sufficiently small, it may well be the case that not everyone stands up.
In order to better study this model, let us now turn to a numerical analysis
of the model.
2.1.2 Numerical Analysis
Our model (and its extensions, which we will discuss below) suggests a vari-
ety of numerical studies. In order to best investigate these cases, we turn to
instantiating the models as agent-based computer simulations. The simula-
tions were written in Netlogo 4.0.4.
In the agent-based simulations, 1089 agents are seated in a 33×33 grid, all
facing the same direction, in order to represent individuals seated in a theater.
As is standard in agent-based models, time is broken up into discrete steps.
In each step of the simulation, seated agents independently assess whether or
not they should stand. Their decision procedure is simply an instantiation
of the equation previously described. As was noted before, agents who are
standing remain standing in perpetuity. Each simulation is run until either
every agent is standing, or 1000 steps have passed. If each step represents
one second of actual time, 1000 steps represents nearly 17 minutes, which we
consider to be the extreme upper end of how long a standing ovation might
last. For the purpose of analysis, all simulations were repeated 100 times.
Complete Information
In our first set of simulations, we examined agents who could see the entire
audience. Their position in the theater had no effect on what information
was available to them. As such, agents all worked from precisely the same
information about what others in the audience were doing.3
As we have previously noted, the baseline model guarantees convergence
on a standing ovation. So instead of discussing whether or not a standing
ovation occurs, we study the speed of convergence. In particular, we are
interested in determining how the parameters specified in the baseline model
than or equal to (1 − (1 − σi) qi)n → 0. Thus, the agent will eventually stand up with
probability one. Since the group is finite, the group will almost surely stand up as well.
3In the complete vision case, the expected time to convergence can be calculated even
without recurring immediately to simulations, but modeling the system as a Markov chain
with phase transitions.
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affect convergence times.4 To examine these effects, we must consider the
agents’ intrinsic propensity to stand up, and the agents’ social sensitivity in
turn. We will first examine the effects of the intrinsic propensity on ovation
convergence.
In our studies of the intrinsic propensity we held social sensitivity σi fixed
at various values (Figure 2.1) so we could examine how the increase of the
intrinsic propensity by itself affected rates of norm convergence. In general
we saw that, as the intrinsic propensity increases, the time of convergence
decreases. This is, of course, exactly what we expect from the mathematics














Figure 2.1: The effect of intrinsic preference on time to convergence
We found a similar story with an examination of the social sensitivity
(figure 2.2). As before, what we saw is that as the social sensitivity increases
the time of convergence decreases. However, the speed of convergence dimin-
ishes at a different rate when the social sensitivity is combined with a very
low value of intrinsic propensity (qi=0.1). This makes perfect sense: when
both the intrinsic propensity and the social sensitivity are very low, it takes
a long time until everyone is standing. It is enough that the social sensitivity
slightly increases for the initial deadlock to be resolved.
We found that both parameters make a notable difference: each can cause
the convergence rate to be significantly faster. However, the manipulation of
4For ease of analysis, we report on those models in which all agents have the same
parameter values. We examined mixed populations, but did not find differences that
merited separate presentation.
















Figure 2.2: The effect of social sensitivity on time to convergence
social sensitivity appears to diminish convergence time more pronouncedly.
This makes also sense: sensitivity to one’s peers will accelerate any band-
wagon effect as the population moves towards convergence.
Incomplete Information
In our second set of simulations, we examined agents who were limited in
how much of the audience they could see. In particular, agents could only
see the agents in front of them within their range of vision. In this model,
agents could see all the way to the front of the theater, but only within a cone
of 30 degrees. Thus, agents could not see anyone behind them, nor anyone
outside of this limited scope of vision in front of them. This extension assigns
different degrees of influence to the agents: those in the front rows are highly
influential as their choices are taken into account by agents seated towards
the rear, whereas the latter’s choices affect few other agents. Notably, we
obtain an asymmetry between information and influence: agents at the front
can only see the behavior of a narrow peer group (or they don’t care about
the rest), while those at the rear have complete insight. This extension
is therefore a particularly intuitive way to model mutual impact in social
hierarchies.5
5The distinction between complete and incomplete vision is a variation in the environ-
ment of the model, whose effects have been explored in this paper throughout different
specifications of the baseline model. Related results have been reported when significant.
Variations in the environment of a model are thus orthogonal to variations in the structure
of the models and to the study of their robustness.
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To describe this more formally, consider an audience of R rows with L
seats in each row. Now everybody takes only a fraction of the whole audience
into account when calculating the extrinsic propensity, for example the cone
of people in front of the person. Then, clearly, the behavior of the people in
the first row will be more important than the behavior of those in the last
row. After all, almost everybody will look at what the people in the first row








Here Mi is the group of people person i can observe.6
As with our study of models of complete information, we first held the
social sensitivity parameter fixed at discrete values to study the effects of
the intrinsic propensity’s increase (Figure 2.3). We found that the model
with incomplete information behaved very similarly to the complete infor-
mation case, though convergence times were notably slower at low values of
qi. Whereas in the complete information case, when qi = 0.1 average time to
convergence was 20.25, in the case of incomplete information average time to
convergence was 59.47. As qi grew, however, these disparities disappeared.
This suggests that while limited information can have a notable effect in
slowing down convergence times in cases of low levels of intrinsic propen-
sities, this effect rapidly diminishes as agents’ intrinsic propensity to stand
increases.
As we turn our attention to the effect of the social sensitivity parameter
however, we find that limited vision has a strikingly large effect that reverses
the trend seen in the model of complete information (Figure 2.4). Whereas
before, moving σi from a low to a medium value induced significantly lower
convergence times, in the model of incomplete information, as σi increases,
convergence time also increases. Once σi > 0.5 we find particularly dramatic
increases in both convergence times and variance. Limited vision of others
has a dramatic effect on convergence, and for good reason. As the social
sensitivity increases, the effect of the intrinsic propensity diminishes. When
only very few agents are in a position to affect the behavior of others, it can
easily happen that they remain seated. This can then lead those that look
6For modeling simplicity, we assume that each agent counts herself as a spectator. In
this way, we avoid the issue that the model would otherwise be undefined for agents in
the front row.















Figure 2.3: The effect of intrinsic propensity on time to convergence in the
limited vision case.
to them for guidance about standing to also remain seated. This dynamic
substantially dampens the bandwagon effect that is found in the baseline















Figure 2.4: The effect of social sensitivity on time to convergence in the
limited vision case.
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2.2 Problems with the Baseline Model
While the baseline model helps to illuminate the basic structure of individual
decisions that can result in the emergence of a descriptive norm such as a
standing ovation, there are several reasons to suspect that the model is not
yet adequate. Drawing upon philosophical and empirical literature on norm
compliance (Bicchieri 2006; Young 2009), we can levy three major criticisms
at the baseline model. We will look at each in turn.
The first way in which our model falls short is that it is not very sensitive
to a more nuanced psychology of decision-making. One thing it fails to
capture is the idea of entrenchment – people can often become set in their
ways over time, and become less and less willing to change their minds,
even if social influences become significant. Additionally, the baseline model
lumps the notion of social sensitivity in with the notion of social contagion:
it assumes that larger and smaller groups exert the same amount of social
influence over a person’s decision. But it is likely that in some instances,
small groups are sufficient for influencing individual choices, while in others,
a much larger group is necessary to change an individual’s decision.
The second way in which our model falls short is that it assumes that
the amount others can influence us is always constant across different con-
texts. But this is unlikely to be the case. In instances where one has strong
preferences, it is likely that social pressure is less important. Whereas, when
someone is fairly indifferent between two actions, social pressure might be
the main determinant of that person’s choice.
The third way our model falls short is that it makes significant structural
assumptions about the nature of descriptive norms that may inhibit its ability
to be a useful general model. This comes in two ways. Most obviously, the
model always leads to a convergence on everyone standing. This is a highly
suspect assumption: there are many concerts in which standing ovations fail
to occur, just as there are many potential descriptive norms that never come
to be. Even still, we can expect many situations in which some, but not all,
agents take on a particular action, and for this to be stable. As it currently
stands, our model cannot capture this fact. Additionally, the model suffers
from having a built-in implicit assumption about the directionality of norms.
In our baseline model, people go from sitting to standing. It is impossible
for sitting to become a norm. Likewise, it should be possible for no norm to
emerge.
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In the following sections, we will present extensions to the baseline model
that will in turn seek to address these three deficiencies. What we will show
is that the qualitative results from our baseline model continue to hold as we
investigate the first two deficiencies. As we explore the structural assump-
tions, we will find additional constraints on the emergence of descriptive
norms that further enrich our account.
2.3 The Inertia Model
In this extension, we seek to address the lack of nuance in the psychology of
the baseline model’s decision procedure. To do this, we make two changes:
First, there is a scaling factor e−αin, 0 < αi < 1 such that the more rounds
have passed, the less likely it is that someone stands up. This allows us to
more carefully investigate the notion of entrenchment. Second, the propen-
sity to stand up as a function of the others’ behavior S(n−1)/M is taken into











+ (1− σi) qi
)
(2.3)
βi can be thought of as a measure of contagion in the group: The smaller
βi (0 < βi < 1), the higher the chance that a few isolated individuals who rise
from their seats will affect the rest of the group. In other words, if we keep the
number of agents following the norm fixed, the propensity of an individual
to follow a norm is higher for smaller βi. This reflects the fact that there are
circumstances in which it takes a few agents to trigger a conformity effect
than others. βi determines the relative influence of the first agents adopting
the norm vis-à-vis those agents that adopt it at a later stage. Thus, agents
with a large βi act on the basis of their propensity and the observed behavior
of a crowd (as opposed to being responsive to the behavior of individuals and
small groups). The break-even point is βi = 1.
In this model, there is a nontrivial probability that not everyone stands
up, even if infinitely many rounds are played.
Finally, it should be stressed once more that contagion and social sensitiv-
ity play different roles: while social sensitivity balances an agent’s individual
preferences against the impact of the behavior of others, the contagion pa-
rameter determines the rate at which the influence of an additional person
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standing declines (or increases) with the number of people standing. If βi is
low the first few people standing will have a much larger influence than the
final few.7
2.3.1 Numerical studies
The inertia model is meant to provide a mechanism for non-complete ova-
tions, by providing a countervailing force on individual decision-making, en-
couraging some to remain seated. This is done with a time-dependent scaling
function, which can be made more powerful by increasing the size of the in-
ertia parameter αi. This is done with a time-dependent scaling function,
which can be made more powerful by increasing the size of the inertia pa-
rameter α. Secondly, it modulates the effect of social influence – by taking
the social sensitivity component of the base model and raising it to the βth
power. We will investigate each of these modifications to the base model in
turn, considering their effect on ovation size in equilibrium.
As the model description indicated, the inertia parameter αi has by far
the largest effect on ovation size. Here we will consider αi with βi fixed at
0.1. In general as the inertia parameter grows, we find an exponential decay
in equilibrium ovation size. We examined values of 0.01 ≤ αi ≤ 0.5 in steps
of 0.01. As represented in figure 2.5, we find a rapid decay in equilibrium
ovation size.
The inertia parameter controls the rate at which agents are willing to
stand as time goes on, which heavily dampens their ability to respond to
new information as it is revealed to them. As agents become increasingly
stubborn as time goes on, this limits their interest in standing regardless of
what anyone else is doing. We find a similar story for increasing values of the
contagion parameter β – since individuals respond less and less to smaller
groups for higher β – it is more difficult to get a bandwagon effect initiated
even if they are increasingly sensitive to large groups. The large groups
simply cannot form if smaller groups do not have sufficient attractive force.
In this way, αi and βi work in concert to limit ovation size: βi limits the power
of an initial small group standing, and then αi increases the stubbornness
7We have also explored a different extension of the model with a counter-force to the
overall conformity. This second way assumes that some people increasingly resist standing
up as more people stand. They act against the mainstream. We do not present this non-
conformist model, as we did not find a significant deviation from the baseline model, even
if this condition may be psychologically relevant.












Figure 2.5: The effect of the inertia parameter on the number of people
standing
of agents sitting as the groups get slightly larger over time. This combined
effect can neuter a group’s ability to create a social bandwagon.
In the inertia model, we find that the imposition of incomplete informa-
tion has very little effect on how the active variables in the model affect
ovation size. In the case of αi, we find no discernible difference between the
complete information model and the model of incomplete information. In













Figure 2.6: The effect of a contagion parameter on the number of people
standing
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2.4 The Endogenous Social Sensitivity Model
The baseline model and its initial extension, the inertia model, consider social
sensitivity as an exogenous parameter: It is a parameter that balances one’s
intrinsic propensity to comply with the behavioral rule with the impact of
group behavior. For an agent with high social sensitivity, the impact of group
behavior will dominate the impact of one’s individual judgment on the quality
of the concert, and vice versa, for an agent with low social sensitivity, group
behavior will have a minor impact on the agent’s decision. Social sensitivity
does not, on that account, depend on one’s intrinsic propensity or the number
of people already following the behavioral rule.
This view can, however, be challenged. In her book The Grammar of
Society, Bicchieri (2006) has shown that empirical expectations of the behav-
ior of others are crucial to whether descriptive norms emerge and persist.
If an agent expects a critical part of the population to follow a behavioral
rule, then she will most likely follow the rule as well. Further, an agent may
only become aware of the existence of a candidate alternative norm once it is
sufficiently widespread in the population. If a large part of the group starts
to comply with the rule, the agent reasonably expects that the behavior will
spread to the entire group, and these expectations overrule an agent’s inde-
pendent preferences as a determinant of her individual behavior. Conversely,
if the percentage of individuals abiding by the rule is lower than such a critical
value, group behavior barely affects individual behavior. Social sensitivity
should thus be treated as an endogenous variable crucially depending on the
observed behavior in the group.
Both in the baseline case and the inertia extension, social sensitivity was
considered exogenous. If it is low at the outset, then it will stay low, even if
the norm spreads rapidly in the group. This delays the convergence process.
It is therefore worthwhile to investigate whether our results remain robust
under the feedback effects described above. To that end, we have to specify
the dependency between the variables of the original model.
We keep the baseline equation (2.1) intact and only write social sensitivity
σ as a function of the other variables.8 As argued above, social sensitivity
should be very low (≈ ε) if S/M is significantly below a critical value, and
very high (≈ 1) if S/M significantly exceeds that value. It is natural to
8This implies that σ is time- and agent-dependent, but for reasons of simplicity, we
drop the subscripts in this exposition.
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assume that the lower the intrinsic propensity q, the higher the threshold: If
an agent strongly dislikes the behavioral rule, her empirical expectations of
compliance with the rule will be higher, and the group will have to behave
more homogenously in order to meet them. Thus, we might choose
σ =
{
1, if S/M≥ 1− q, ∧ P = q
ε, otherwise.
(2.4)
Figure 2.7 below gives a graphic representation of the model. On the x
axis is the number of people standing up in the total audience, on the y axis







Figure 2.7: Discontinuous Model
When the intrinsic propensity of an individual is high her reliance upon
others for the decision to stand up or not is triggered by few individuals
standing, whereas when it is low she needs to see more people to follow them
as well.9
2.4.1 Numerical Studies
In this set of simulations, we studied the effect of the intrinsic propensity
on time of convergence. We examined values of q varying from 0.01 to 1 in
steps of 0.01 For simplicity of our treatment, we do not introduce the inertia
and contagion parameters, as we have previously examined them in isolation.
9It is, however, not clear whether real social sensitivity is as discontinuous as this
equation suggests. It seems more realistic that in many cases people have moderate in-
dividual preference coupled with moderate social sensitivity. So we ‘smooth’ the function
by introducing an additional parameter that governs the quickness of the transition. We
did not find that this variation had a significant difference on the final result, so we only
report on the discontinuous case, as the mathematics are more straightforward.
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Further, as we didn’t find crucial differences between the incomplete and the
complete information case, we only present the first case. As expected, and
the figure below shows, we find that the time of convergence decreases for










Figure 2.8: The effect of the endogenous sigma on the time to convergence
2.5 The Symmetric Model
In our final model, we consider a generalization of our original model. As
we have previously discussed, the models we have been considering thus far
all have an implicit directionality: people start out sitting, and potentially
stand. The only descriptive norm that can emerge is one of ovation. But this
assumption limits our ability to describe the emergence of descriptive norms
more generally. As an example, consider the norm that governs how forks are
used while eating. In Europe, a fork is used in the left hand, so as to enable
the eater to use a knife in her right hand. In the United States, however,
while forks are held in one’s left hand while cutting food, they are then moved
to the right hand for raising food to one’s mouth. While either method of
using forks is perfectly suitable for consuming food in a polite and efficient
manner, they are regionally segregated. In the United States, it is rare to see
the European method, and the US method is rarely seen in Europe. What
we can notice is that there is no particular reason to think that one method
is prior to the other, so we cannot model this as a standing ovation. So
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how might we provide an explanatory framework for the emergence of norms
when the potential behaviors are on equal footing?10
What we propose is a return to our baseline model (2.1), but with a
few crucial changes. First, we introduce two agent types, each type having
a preference for one of the two actions available to them. So type 1 agents
prefer action 1, and type 2 agents prefer action 2. Second, we re-interpret the
variable 0 < q < 1, such that 0.5 represents the indifference point, rather than
0. On this new interpretation, 1 represents a strong preference for the action
of one’s type, and 0 represents a strong preference away from this action.
Third, we allow agents to change their minds: whereas in previous models
once an agent has chosen to stand, she must remain standing, in this model
agents can reverse course and go back to their previous action. Finally, when
we initialize the model, agents are randomly (and independently) assigned
an initial starting action. So, unlike previous models, our starting state
has half of the agents performing the first action (say, the European way of
using forks), and half the agents performing the second action (like the US
method of using forks). These changes allow us to investigate several things
that could not be examined in previous models. In particular, since we are
treating the two methods of using forks as symmetrical to each other, and we
allow agents to change their minds, we should expect the models to exhibit
more complex behavior. More importantly, however, we are now able to
clearly separate cases of norm emergence from behavioral regularities, since
we have differing preferences amongst agents.11
The model’s equilibrium states can be broken down into three classes:
descriptive norm emergence, large-scale behavioral regularities, and a mix of
behaviors. Descriptive norm emergence is found when the entire population
settles on a single action. In these cases, half of the population must be going
against their intrinsic preferences, and instead their social sensitivity drives
their decision-making. This can be contrasted against large-scale behavioral
regularities, which are cases in which all agents of one type choose the same
10Young (2009) develops a model of innovation diffusion that assumes priority of one
action over another, that shares some characteristics with Schelling (1971). While this
model is rather elegant, it does not capture the possibility of equal footing for either
norm, or the possibility of no norm emerging.
11Recall that while descriptive norms rely on agents being motivated out of a desire to
do what others do, behavioral regularities are simply cases in which individuals all perform
the same action, but for independent reasons. They just all happen to prefer the same
action.
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action, but choose a different action from agents of another type. So everyone
who prefers European fork-handling employs it, and likewise everyone who
prefers US fork-handling does so. In this case, we claim that individual
preferences are the most powerful guide to decision-making, and so social
sensitivity effectively drops out of consideration. Our final case is what is
left over: a mix of influences, none of which is strong enough to completely
guide behavior. In these cases, both preferences and social sensitivity are at
work, neither of which is sufficiently strong to overpower the other. So we
find an unsystematic mix of behaviors.
Let us now turn to a numerical analysis of this model.
2.5.1 Numerical Studies
This model requires a different approach to our analysis. Rather than con-
sider something like time to convergence, we must instead consider the prob-
abilities of settling into the three different states for the different values of
intrinsic preference and social sensitivity. The initial state is shown in the
figure below, as it appears in the Netlogo interface. The grid represents the
theatre audience, composed by two agent types: squares are agents who pre-
fer standing and circles are agents who prefer sitting. White squares stay
for those agents who perform their preferred action, in this case standing,
otherwise they are black. Black circles stay for those agents who perform
their preferred action, namely sitting, otherwise they are white.
Figure 2.9: Symmetric Model’s Initial State
In the set of simulations for the symmetric model we examined the prob-
ability for a norm to emerge according the distributions of social sensitivity
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and intrinsic propensity between the audience. The norm emergence corre-
sponds to a state in which all agents in the audience perform the same action,
regardless of their intrinsic propensity. Graphically (figure 2.10), this hap-
pens when all circles and squares are white (or when all circles and squares
are black).





























Figure 2.11: The probability of descriptive norms’ emergence
What we found was that the emergence of full descriptive norms is quite
rare. Figure 2.11 represents the probability of descriptive norms emergence
for increasing values of intrinsic propensity. Each curve corresponds to fixed
values of social sensitivity. We can see that this probability increases as the
agents become indifferent between the two actions (q ' 0.5) and in general
for higher values of social sensitivity.
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More common are large-scale behavioral regularities. These occur when
agents perform their favorite action, e.g. when all squares are standing and
all circles are sitting. These outcomes can happen for wider ranges of so-
cial sensitivity, so long as the intrinsic preference is more extreme in value.
Figure 2.13 shows that the probability of behavioral regularities is lower for
intermediate values of intrinsic propensity and for lower values of social sen-
sitivity.






















Figure 2.13: The probability of behavioral regularities’ emergence
Most common of all, however, are mixed outcomes, those in which some
of the agents perform their preferred outcome and others don’t (graphically,
this corresponds to a situation similar to the initial state but with a different
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distribution of colors, according to those circles and squares that modified
their initial state).
This result seems to comport well with the real world: though descriptive
norms are quite common and are found in a very wide variety of social situa-
tions, there are many more possible descriptive norms than there are actual
descriptive norms. Most of our day-to-day behaviors are not norm-governed,
even though many are.
2.6 Conclusions
We have argued that a model of standing ovations can provide a useful frame-
work for the investigation of the emergence of descriptive norms. While we do
not claim that all descriptive norms have the character of standing ovations,
we have tried to suggest that with a few modifications, we can transform
a model of standing ovations into a general model of the emergence of des-
criptive norms. In particular, we wish to stress the qualitative match of
results across the various models we present. The baseline, inertia, and en-
dogenous social sensitivity models all explore the convergence dynamics of
a ‘directed’ transition from one behavior to another. Though they build in
substantively different psychological assumptions about the agents involved,
we find that these large perturbations do not shift us far away from our
original baseline results.
While descriptive norms themselves most often are not fully captured by
the baseline model, it can often be the case that these sorts of directed tran-
sitions can describe the propagation of information about the social context
for behaviors. For example, Christians remove hats in church to show proper
deference, but not at sporting events. When they enter a novel environment,
for which they may or may not have to signal deference – say, going into
a classroom or a museum for the first time – they may look to others for
signals of what they should do. When we enter into a novel situation, we
may not be sure which of our already-established norms ought to govern our
behavior. A directed transition model, like a standing ovation, might be a
good representation of this sort of phenomenon.
The final model we consider, we contend, does capture the essential el-
ements of the emergence of descriptive norms, given that it is possible for
any behavioral rule, or none at all, to emerge as a norm. What is so striking
about this last model is that it is only a minor modification of the original
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baseline model, but provides a dynamic that displays the relevant consid-
erations for the potential emergence of a descriptive norm. We did not do
anything to change the fundamental decision procedure – we simply allowed
people to change their minds, and have preferences for more than one ac-
tion. But with these small changes, we generalized the model, and enabled
ourselves to discuss a much larger class of social phenomena.
This kind of modeling offers some insights into the nature of descriptive
norms that might be difficult to arrive at otherwise. In particular, what we
find, especially by studying our symmetric model, is that whether a norm
emerges at all, let alone which norm it is, is remarkably contingent on factors
that have nothing to do with the substance of the norm itself. Whether it is
table manners or audience behaviors, or even how we dress, we do not follow
them because they are somehow superior to their alternatives, but rather
we follow them because a mix of social and personal factors happened to
nudge us in one direction rather than the other. We often place value on
these norms, but we should avoid making the mistake of thinking that this
value comes from the action itself. Rather, we can see the value of an action
coming from the fact that we have become accustomed to doing it.
In the next chapter, I will consider a different decisional rule for norm
compliance, based on a Bayesian updating mechanism for belief revision. I
will investigate the question of whether it is possible to provide a rational
reconstruction of the individual behavior to conform to a descriptive norm.
In so doing, an alternative explanatory framework will be presented, that
grounds the inference to the existence of a norm in the same reasoning process
we use to infer regularities in the natural world.
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Chapter 3
Why are descriptive norms
there?
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter deals with various heuristic models for the emergence
of descriptive norms.1 But this leaves a challenge: why should we expect
those heuristics? Is there some deeper justification that we can find for the
social dynamics under investigation? As we have seen, descriptive norms are
a curious class of behaviors: unlike social norms, there is no strong normative
component. Unlike conventions, they aren’t solutions to two-sided coordina-
tion problems.2 Descriptive norms exist where individuals follow a common
pattern of behavior simply because they have a preference for that behavior,
if they think enough of the rest of the population follows it as well.3
By and large, descriptive norms don’t need to exist at all – they aren’t
solving problems that social groups need solutions to. Even so, our lives are
full of descriptive norms. Fashions, fads and all manner of trends fall under
the category of descriptive norms. Opinion dynamics, and some ways of
1This chapter is based on Muldoon, Lisciandra and Hartmann (under review).
2Descriptive norms can be understood either as one-sided coordination problems, or
as creating them in a similar manner to the (Bicchieri 2006) account of social norms
transforming mixed motive games into coordination games. Unlike a convention, which
provides a solution to a two-sided coordination game, there is no need to coordinate
expectations across parties. One party can simply choose to match what others do.
3We follow Bicchieri’s definition (Bicchieri 2006). More formally, a descriptive norm
is a behavioral rule R for a population P in a context C where individuals in P have a
conditional preference to follow R if they believe that a large enough proportion of the
population P follows R in C. This belief is their empirical expectation of rule compliance.
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expressing political or religious support, can follow the patterns of descriptive
norms. These norms emerge from our social interactions, continuously and
spontaneously.4
Precisely because descriptive norms do not represent solutions to prob-
lems that social groups face, a distinguishing feature of descriptive norms is
they are essentially unconstrained in content. There isn’t an underlying fact
about the behavioral rules themselves that will guide a population to one
descriptive norm versus another, because either is equally good. This sug-
gests that the reasons a particular descriptive norm is ‘chosen’ is independent
of its substance. This is rather different from other previously studied social
dynamics, such as the diffusion of a new technology (Young 2009), where
features of the choices help guide the pattern of adoption. A new fashion
trend isn’t typically adopted because of pragmatic features of the new fash-
ion. For instance, ‘Brown is the new Black’ is a rather different claim than,
say, pointing out that word processors make writing and editing documents
easier. While some people may prefer brown due to personal tastes prior to
any new trend, that is not quite the same as recognizing the innate superior-
ity of brownness over blackness, in the way that we may want to argue that
word processors are just superior to typewriters. Quirks of personal taste
may leave some in favor of typewriters for a time, but word processors end
up taking over because of their efficiency and additional capabilities. In the
case of color choice between brown and black, there is no such outside objec-
tive measure that can push people to one color or the other. In the case of
descriptive norms more generally, we can understand the process of change
as being governed purely by the process itself. The chosen norms need not
offer any advantage over their alternatives.
In what follows, we propose that the emergence of descriptive norms,
and their apparent arbitrariness and instability, can in fact be understood
in light of a larger epistemic apparatus. Within this framework, descriptive
norms are seen as a byproduct of a domain-general mechanism of hypothesis
4The distinction between descriptive norms and other informal norms, such as social
norms or conventions, however, has fuzzy boundaries. Even in trivial cases, like following
a fashion trend, a few individuals might follow them out of fear of punishment or of social
rejection, even if no one else would even think of punishing them. Individuals can have
a variety of motivations – sometimes one subset of people have normative expectations
(the belief that others think you ought to follow the rule), while the rest of the population
only has empirical expectations. For our purposes, we focus only on canonical cases of
descriptive norms where people lack second-order normative beliefs.
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generation and belief revision. In particular, we argue that our disposition
to find and follow rules stems not from their immediate utility, but rather
from the immense value that the general epistemic apparatus has in our lives.
That is, while the general disposition to discover rules and act on the basis
of our knowledge of them can be utility enhancing, this does not mean that
each instance of rule-following must itself be justified on such grounds. Any
given descriptive norm may well be arbitrary, even if the general process that
creates them is not.
To describe this process, we imagine that an individual finds himself in
a situation similar to that of a scientist who is looking for the evidence in
support of his hypothesis. As the rational way to proceed in order to esti-
mate the probability of a certain hypothesis about the world is by Bayesian
updating, similarly, we express the individual decision problem as a condi-
tional probability. Accordingly, the individual’s degree of beliefs in an action
being a norm is a function of the evidence of other people’s behavior and
their reliability. In other words, unlike in the previous chapter, here agents
are Bayesian updaters – they have a domain-general reasoning system that
helps them to update their hypotheses about how the (social) world around
them operates in light of new evidence.
Notice that the specific interest in descriptive norms is twofold: first,
these are norms which involve only one level of expectations – namely, what
an individual believes the majority of people will do in similar situations.
This allows for a formal model of their emergence to remain easily treatable;
secondly, the philosophical question about this type of norms is whether – at
least under some conditions – rational agents will comply with them, given
the behavior of the members of their group, even if there is no objective
reason to do so. When dealing with descriptive norms, the hypothesis under
consideration, namely whether the norm is worth following or not, is probably
neither right or wrong per se. In cases like these, the evidence provided by
other people’s behavior becomes the only element upon which to rely. There
is no external or objective source of information about the hypothesis, beyond
the actions of others.5 Within an epistemic framework we can analyze the
way in which this evidence is processed by rational agents given a domain-
general updating system, and we can see the consequences of that process.
5Recall the ‘Brown is the new Black’ claim versus ‘word processors are superior to
typewriters’ – we can have efficiency measures to compare the machines, but we would be
at a loss for an equivalent measure for the colors.
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This chapter will proceed as follows: First, we present an analytic model
of an individual’s reasoning that we employ. Next, we will describe a com-
puter simulation that implements this for a group of agents that have some
structure to what they can discover socially. We then analyze the results
of the simulation, and argue that this model provides evidence that we can
make sense of the emergence of descriptive norms if we see it as an instance
of a larger cognitive apparatus that helps us be responsive to evidence. Fi-
nally, we argue that this practice of more domain-general idealized reasoning
– using very strong rationality assumptions that likely go beyond our cogni-
tive capacities – allows us to see more universal dynamics across a number
of social situations.
3.2 The Model
When studying the emergence of social behaviors, we need a formalism that
can account not just for what happens at a group level, but how individual
decisions lead to a group outcome. In this study we rely on a Bayesian
approach, primarily for its ability to carefully monitor what happens at the
individual level.6 With a Bayesian model, we can express the individual’s
degrees of belief about a certain hypothesis and elaborate it with the laws
of probability calculus. Broadly speaking, Bayesian epistemology deals with
the logic of inductive reasoning and expresses formally how we should learn
from experience and how we should estimate our hypotheses under conditions
of uncertainty (see Hartmann and Sprenger (2010) for an introduction to
Bayesian Epistemology).
The mathematics of Bayes’ rule is straightforward. Its main components
are the priors, namely the probability of the hypothesis before the evidence,
and the likelihoods, which measure the probability that the evidence supports
the hypothesis. By Bayes’ rule, these components are used to compute the
posterior probability, namely the probability of the hypothesis conditional on
the empirical evidence.
As a domain-general updating process, Bayes’ rule can be applied to a
variety of situations. According to the context, the priors and the likelihoods
express the role of different pieces of information for our hypothesis. It
6Nothing in our argument relies on Bayesian updating in particular – we employ
Bayesian updating because it is a well-understood, straightforward model of domain-
general belief revision.
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can deal with the probability of getting a red ball when drawing from urns
filled with balls of different colors, or how much a positive test result should
change one’s beliefs about whether one has contracted a disease, or in legal
settings, how conclusive DNA evidence might be in determining the guilt
of a defendant. Across these cases, Bayes’ rule shows us how much we can
learn from new information and update our previous beliefs to arrive at a
new belief about the probability of some hypothesis.7
In the same way in which Bayes’ rule is used to reconstruct an ideal pro-
cess of updating one’s beliefs about a certain hypothesis about the physical
world, in this study we adopt it to model changes in beliefs about hypothe-
ses about our social world. The way we draw social inferences resembles
the more general process of learning from experience. However, in the social
world, evidence is interactive: we learn from each other’s choices8. To model
this situation, we suppose that the members of a group assign a probability
to whether a given behavior is a descriptive norm on the basis of the priors,
namely the probability of the hypothesis before the observed behavior and
of the empirical evidence at their disposal. In this estimate, however, not all
evidence is treated equally. We assume that not only are some individuals
more reliable than others (in terms of reliably following norms when present),
but also that different individuals are more or less sensitive to other people’s
behavior.
In what follows, we will formulate a Bayesian model of norm discovery.
Our model aims to be a simplified representation of a social situation in
which there are multiple behavioral patterns, at most one of which emerges
over time as a descriptive norm. To do this, we have eliminated as many
superfluous features of real social systems as we could to focus on the core
dynamics. The model consists of n agents, representing some pre-existing so-
cial group. Within this pre-existing social group are two common behaviors:
one which we label N – the behavioral rule we consider as a possible des-
criptive norm – and its alternative. The model is agnostic about the content
of these behaviors. We choose one as N without any loss of generality. The
model treats both behavioral patterns symmetrically. The model unfolds
over time. We divide time into discrete rounds, and all agents complete the
decision process exactly once per round. In what follows, we will formally
describe that decision procedure and how it drives the model.
7See Hacking (2001) for a formal treatment of the aforementioned examples.
8See Schelling (1978) for typical interactive, critical-mass models in the social sciences
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Each agent has beliefs about the state of the world with respect to the
proposed behavioral rule. We represent this formally as follows. Each agent
has a propositional variable H, which can have two values. ‘H’, means that
the behavior is a descriptive norm. ‘¬H’ simply means that it is not a norm.
Furthermore, agents can have beliefs not just about the status of the behav-
ioral rule as a descriptive norm itself, but about what others are doing. The
variables E
(k)
i (with i = 1, . . . , n) have two values: E
(k)
i : Group member i
follows the proposed behavioral rule in round k, and ¬E(k)i : Group member
i does not follow the proposed behavioral rule in round k.
In round 0, everybody is equipped with a probability function P
(0)
i and
starts with a prior probability of H, i.e.
P
(0)
i (H) = q , (3.1)
with i = 1, . . . , n. We call q the intrinsic propensity to follow the norm.
This is simply the agent’s internal preference for the behavior, independent
of what anyone else does. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that all group
members have the same intrinsic propensity. This assumption can easily be
relaxed. On the basis of the prior probability and the epistemic sensitivity
(more on this parameter below), group member i will follow N or not.
At the end of round 0, each agent has a profile F (0) about other agents’
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for all i, j = 0, . . . , n and all rounds k ≥ 0. The assumption is as follows:
If we know that the behavioral rule is a descriptive norm (or not), then we
will learn nothing new about the question as to whether group member i
follows the norm if we learn that group member j follows the norm. What
group member i does depends only on the truth value of H. A further
justification for the conditional independence is that people might simply
assume that the individuals act on the basis of the norm and not on the
basis of what others are doing. In other words, within a subjective Bayesian
framework, it is sufficient that individuals assume conditional independence
for the assumption to apply.9










j |¬H) = c .
Here c is a parameter that measures the expected compliance. That is,
it measures to what extent group member i believes that group member j
will follow the behavioral rule if it is a descriptive norm, or not follow the
behavioral rule if it is not a descriptive norm.



















where ni = |Ci|, i.e. the number of group members in the cone of group
member i.
9It might be asked why an individual should assume conditional independence, given
that that assumption is false for her. The main rationale is that, when deciding whether
or not to follow a descriptive norm, individuals have the tendency to disregard their own
responsiveness to other people’s behavior. In other words, individuals tend to believe
that they are among the first ones to adopt a certain new behavior, that they have not
been influenced by other people, and that it is their personal taste for the object or the
action in question that determines their choices. This is the sense according to which the
independence assumption holds as a psychological motivation underlying the individual
decisions to comply with descriptive norms.
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These equations generalize to later rounds. In round k + 1, all group
members update according to
P
(k+1)














In each round k, we assume that group member i decides to follow the be-
havioral rule if P
(k)
i (H) > 1− s. Here s is the agent’s epistemic sensitivity.
We assume that the group members continue to update their beliefs even
if they are already following the behavioral rule. It is therefore possible that
someone who followed the behavioral rule in round k will stop following the
behavioral rule in round k + 1. This is simply to better match the real
world – fads can fade away over time. Once a behavioral rule has become a
descriptive norm and has full compliance by a given social group, it may be
difficult to move away from it, but it does happen with some regularity.10 To
better capture the possibility of these dynamics, we do not artificially limit
the updating procedure to simply favor norm adoption.
The reader should notice that in this model, each agent applies the stan-
dard Bayesian belief revision machinery to the particular case of norm adop-
tion. We suppose that this belief revision machinery is around for other
aspects of one’s life – it is present in our social reasoning because it is used
generally when we reason about the world. We enhance this general model
by supposing that there are a few specifically social characteristics of our
reasoning that must also be taken into account. These will be discussed in
more detail in the next section. However, we note that the small addition
of these parameters is all that is necessary to transform the basic reasoning
process of Bayesian updating into a social rule discovery mechanism.
10Grunge clothing was popular for several years before it largely disappeared. Bangs
are sometimes widely adopted, and then disappear for a while. Text messaging has largely
supplanted once-dominant phone calls for quick messages amongst friends.
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3.3 Simulating the Model
In order to best explore the model’s dynamics, particularly with larger social
groups, it was necessary to implement the model in an agent-based simula-
tion. Agent-based simulation allowed us to use a relatively large population
(1089 agents), and investigate somewhat more realistic representations of
peer influence. For the purposes of this study, we imagine agents to be sitting
in a 33× 33 grid, with everyone facing forward.11 Each agent sees the agents
in its front visual cone (See Figure 2.1). The intuition behind this represen-
tation is that each agent’s information and influence is position-dependent.
The farther back one is, the more information they have, since they can see
more of the other agents. However, the closer one is to the front, the more
influence one has, as they are more likely to be seen by others. This structure
allows us to represent real-world hierarchical relations in social groups in a
general way. This is motivated by work using models of standing ovations as
representations of social influence (Miller and Page 2004).12 For the purpose
of analysis, all simulations were repeated 100 times. 13
Each agent starts out by following either the proposed behavioral rule or
its alternative. This choice, since it relates to a particular action, is fully
visible to others.14 Because of this, agents can reliably update their beliefs.
11We implemented this simulation in Netlogo 4.0.4. The grid size is the simulation
software’s default setting. We explored smaller grids, and did not see qualitative differ-
ences. We report on this population size as a compromise between the desire for a large
social group, and the super-linear increase in computational costs (in terms of time) of
the simulation as more agents are added.
12While many other network structures are possible, we focus on this approach. There
is not a significant qualitative change if we use a more standard Von Neumann or Moore 8
neighborhood. What primarily drives the results is the agents’ limited information. The
assumption of local information and some social hierarchy in how descriptive norms emerge
is based on the consideration that full information models are extremely unrealistic – very
rarely in our social lives to we have complete social information about an entire extended
social group.
13The three main parameters, i.e. intrinsic propensity, expected compliance and epis-
temic sensitivity are bounded between 0 and 1 and in the simulations we observed the
effect of the variation of one parameter, while keeping the two other fixed on medium,
low, or high values.
14Think of clothing fashions, for example. Descriptive norms, especially ones that have
any longevity, have to be associated with some public display or action, otherwise empirical
expectations cannot be coordinated. Since there is no normative aspect, there is no reason
to a have a descriptive norm about private behavior. Outside of actions influenced by our
normative expectations, private behaviors do not have social motivations.
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Figure 3.1: Series of grids representing different agents’ visual fields. The
grey cones in each grid show the visual field of the agent at the vertex of the
cone.
We investigate what happens as agents update their beliefs over time. Un-
der what conditions should we expect norm emergence? Our investigation
revolves around the three free parameters of the model. These parameters
augment the standard Bayesian approach by injecting social aspects of our
reasoning. These social aspects are the intrinsic propensity of an agent to
follow the proposed behavioral rule, an agent’s assessment of other agents’
expected compliance to the behavioral rule, and each agent’s epistemic sen-
sitivity.
More specifically, the intrinsic propensity measures the individual pref-
erence to follow the behavioral rule regardless of other people’s behavior.
This parameter (combined with the epistemic sensitivity) affects the initial
conditions of the model. We use these parameters to determine the initial
distribution of agent behaviors. In subsequent rounds, agents update on the
evidence provided by other individuals according to the Bayesian procedure
described above. If we reflect on the meaning of these parameters, we ought
to expect that by and large the average individual would be fairly neutral
between choices of action, since there is no particular utility benefit to ei-
ther action. In the case of descriptive norms, people’s priors should not be
that strong in either direction. As such, we should expect that instantiations
of the intrinsic propensity parameter should be somewhere in the middle of
the range from ‘absolutely in favor of the behavioral rule’ and ‘absolutely
against the behavioral rule’. In such cases of relative indifference, the other
two parameters of the model matter more to an individual’s choice: expected
compliance and epistemic sensitivity. However, there are scenarios in which
we might expect strong individual preferences for given behavioral rules. Due
for example to their past experience, individuals might behave according to
consolidated practices, that they bring along once in a new group. If the pro-
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posed behavioral rule happens to link to an individual’s larger set of views
or preferences, we might find more extremal values for intrinsic propensities.
For instance, some people like wearing plaid shirts, regardless of whether
there is a larger grunge fashion trend. Some might think that text messaging
is a distasteful form of communication, even if many others use it.
The expected compliance parameter measures the reliability that each
agent assigns to the members of the group. It indicates if the source of
evidence matters for the decision as to whether to follow the norm. In real-
world scenarios, this corresponds to reliable or influential people who, for
whatever reason, are considered to be competent on that matter. Hence,
agents who have been assigned high expected compliance will be judged as
reliable indicators of the presence of a norm if they are following it and of the
behavioral rule’s failure of becoming a norm if they are not following it. This
helps capture the idea that we have potentially different assessments of the
same evidence (following the behavioral rule) when it comes from different
sources (more or less reliable trendsetters).
The epistemic sensitivity parameter measures an agent’s individual
degree of responsiveness to perceived empirical regularities. In other words,
the epistemic sensitivity parameter is the means by which agents convert their
epistemic state into a motivation for action. For instance, in a non-social case,
epistemic sensitivity determines whether an agent would act on her belief that
a particular river floods with some regularity. This may lead her to build her
house farther away from the river’s banks. In the social case, it reflects the
fact that some agents are more responsive to social cues than others. Some
people seek to match their behavior to perceived behavioral rules. Others
see the social regularities, but just don’t change their behavior as a result.
Most people fall somewhere in the middle – we may care what others do,
but it isn’t our only concern. This parameter allows us to investigate these
different cases systematically.
The main predictions of the model can be summarized as follows:
1. Norm emergence is incompatible with an adverse intrinsic propensity.
If agents strongly prefer doing something else, then they will not follow
the proposed behavioral rule. More generally, this means that norm
emergence is not guaranteed in the mathematics of the model. Not all
behavioral rules become descriptive norms.
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2. Other things being equal, the higher the epistemic sensitivity, the more
probable that the proposed behavioral rule will in fact become a des-
criptive norm.
3. The agents’ decisions correlate with those agents to whom they assign
high expected compliance. Otherwise, decisions are independent of
each other.
4. The higher the expected compliance, the more the evidence weighs
in favor of or against the hypothesis. In other words, if agents are
considered to be highly reliable, their behaviors will have a greater
impact on other people than those of less reliable people. This means
that it takes fewer more reliable agents for the emergence of a norm
than of less reliable agents.
To examine these predictions, we ran a series of simulations to experi-
ment with the effect of the parameters. We present the results in the follow-
ing subsections. In the next section, we will consider how the model does
at providing a general explanatory framework for the phenomena of norm
emergence.
3.3.1 Simulation results
The results of the simulations show under which conditions a descriptive
norm does or does not emerge, and how the parameters and their interplay
affect the final outcome.
In the first group of simulations, we analyzed descriptive norm emergence
as a function of the agents’ intrinsic propensity. As predicted by Bayes’ rule,
the higher the priors, the higher the probability that the hypothesis under
consideration holds true. In our study, this is reflected by the fact that the
probability for descriptive norm emergence increases when intrinsic propen-
sities for the behavioral rule increase in intensity, as shown in Figure 2.2. We
see that full convergence on the candidate behavioral rules obtains for high
values of intrinsic propensity combined with moderate to high values of ex-
pected compliance and epistemic sensitivity. When the intrinsic propensity
decreases, the percentage of individuals following the norm decreases pro-
portionally. This is what we expected from the mathematics of the model
and expresses the idea that if the preference for the behavior is low then the
chance that it spreads are low as well. This is unsurprising – more preferable
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behaviors are more likely to spread in a population. Less preferable behav-
iors have a harder time. We may pay attention to what others do and change











Figure 3.2: Probability P of a norm to emerge as a function of intrin-
sic propensity q combined with medium expected compliance (c=.7) and
medium epistemic sensitivity (s=.7) .
In the second group of simulations, we analyzed the conditions for norm
emergence as a function of the expected compliance parameter. By Bayes’
rule, the likelihood affects the estimate of a certain hypothesis in such a
way that the higher its value, the more significant the evidence is for the
hypothesis at stake. In our study, this is reflected by the fact that descriptive
norms emerge when reliable individuals follow the behavioral rule and they
do not emerge when unreliable individuals follow the behavioral rule. To
study the role of the expected compliance parameter on the individuals’
decisions over time, we monitored the posterior probability of a few spatially
randomized agents, from the beginning of the simulation to the equilibrium
point. The simulations results showed that agents tend to follow the norm
when the expected compliance parameter is high and it is combined with
high intrinsic propensity. By contrast, other simulations showed that agents
do not follow the norm when the expected compliance parameter is combined
with low intrinsic propensity. In both cases this happens because everyone
considers other people’s behavior to be highly dependent on the truth or
falsity of the hypothesis. Hence, they only follow the behavioral rule if enough
other people follow it, and they don’t otherwise, suggesting that only in the
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former population does the behavioral rule become a descriptive norm.
We find that the expected compliance parameter has a large influence
over the model. Note that the tipping point is when the parameter is at 0.5.
When the parameter is in the range (0.5, 1], agents count other agents’ be-
havior as significant evidence for or against the hypothesis. As the parameter
value trends towards 1, it is harder for a norm to emerge. This seems a bit
peculiar at first, but on reflection, it is straightforward. As expected compli-
ance ramps up, any time we see someone not following the behavioral rule,
that is considered to be significant adverse evidence. If people are reliable
indicators, and someone is not following the behavioral rule, then we surmise
that the rule hasn’t become a descriptive norm. Evidential standards get
more stringent when we perceive the data to be less noisy. Adverse behavior
is less likely to be a fluke, and is instead interpreted as evidence that there is
no norm. We illustrate this phenomenon in Figure 2.3, where the probability















Figure 3.3: Probability P of a norm to emerge as a function of intrinsic
propensity q combined with increasing values of expected compliance (c=.6,
. . . , c=.9 and medium epistemic sensitivity).
Intrinsic propensity is represented on the x axis. The y axis tracks the
percentage of agents following the behavioral rule. We plot different values of
the expected compliance parameter on the same set of axes to compare them.
We see when the expected compliance parameter is lower, agents need to see
fewer agents following the behavioral rule to comply with it themselves.
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Finally, we used the simulation to explore the effects of the epistemic sen-
sitivity parameter. In the model there is a gap between discovering whether
the behavioral rule is a descriptive norm and the decision to follow it. The
same probability estimate can induce an epistemically sensitive agent to fol-
low the norm and a less sensitive one not to follow it. Keeping other things
equal, we see that when the value of the epistemic sensitivity is low, there
is never norm emergence. Social information is simply irrelevant. When in-
stead the epistemic sensitivity is high, at the end of the simulation all agents
follow the norm. In other words, for the same probability assigned to the
hypothesis that the behavioral rule is a descriptive norm, the difference in
epistemic sensitivity induces agents to consider or ignore this information.
These results combine to show the conditions under which Bayesian agents
will come to decide that a behavioral rule is in fact a descriptive norm and
comply with that behavior. In summary, the simulations help to illustrate
to what extent the individual preference matters for the emergence of the
norm, and how reliable and socially sensitive individuals affect the process.15
Simply relying on a domain-general belief revision mechanism, we can
generate rather complex social behavior. As we should expect from our ev-
eryday experience with descriptive norms, not every behavioral rule becomes
a descriptive norm. Actions that most people don’t like much rarely if ever
become descriptive norms. When we think people are only moderately reli-
able in detecting whether a behavior is a descriptive norm or not, it’s more
likely that we pick out patterns in the noise that might not have been there
in the first place. In these results, we find qualitative agreement with results
from previous heuristic models, such as that presented in the previous chap-
ter, but as we will discuss in the following section, we claim that the latter
approach can offer a deeper explanation of the phenomena.
15Several mechanisms might determine the decline of a norm. Two clear candidates are
that either a new norm emerges and people switch to it or that an old norm simply fades
over time. The former option can serve as a useful description of fashion cycles, while the
latter option is particularly clear in the case of fads – eventually they just get old and
unexciting. Since we are focusing on norm emergence we leave out considerations of norm
decay in order to reduce the complexity of the model.
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3.4 Using the Model as a Unifying Explana-
tion
When we consider how to model complex phenomena like norm emergence,
there are two different (and complementary) approaches that can be pursued.
First, we might want to look at the proximate reasons for norm emergence.
Given some assumptions about how we behave in social situations, how do
norms come about? Here, we have seen that heuristic models are often
going to be particularly useful. Heuristic models present cognitively realistic
mechanisms for norm emergence. These heuristic models let us consider the
world of boundedly rational agents, and how, despite these limitations, they
can systematically create new descriptive norms when the conditions are
appropriate. What these heuristic models cannot do, however, is motivate
themselves. Nothing internal to the model can tell us why people might track
what others do and treat that as evidence for what they themselves should
do. Heuristic models – by design – can only speak to proximate causes,
not ultimate causes. They do not attempt to ask questions broader than
proximate explanation.
Descriptive norms, since they are devoid of any normative force, could
seem quite strange if we just look at them with heuristic models. We know
that descriptive norms exist, and heuristic models help us understand how
they form, given that we’re the sorts of agents that look for social rules to
follow. But why we are the sorts of agents that have descriptive norms at
all goes unanswered. It is only when we turn to a more domain-general
style of modeling that we can see that descriptive norms are a side-effect:
they are the accidental combination of our system for belief updating and its
application to the social realm.
This second approach to modeling complex phenomena offers a deeper
explanatory framework. Here, rather than focusing on the details of an in-
dividual’s thought process, we can ask ourselves if there is a more general
explanation for the pattern of behavior. Namely, can we help explain why
agents look for rules of behavior to follow in the first place? In particular, is
there a way of explaining this phenomenon by demonstrating its connection
to mechanisms we understand in other areas of science? Reconstructing the
general epistemic process helps us understand the pattern of behavior, even if
it does not necessarily capture the precise details of an individual’s cognitive
processes. What’s more, by relying on idealized models of epistemic updat-
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ing, such as Bayesian updating, we can more easily see how the phenomenon
under study can be understood as instances of a broader framework that
has shown success elsewhere. Bayesian reasoning is domain-general, and has
been used to examine problems across epistemology and the philosophy of
science (Chater and Oaksford 2008; Griffiths et al. 2010; Tentori et al. 2007;
Schupbach 2010).16 Though we may lose a bit in our proximate explana-
tions of individual behavior, by not focusing on the details of the decision
processes of cognitively limited agents, our more general reconstruction of
this behavior allows us to see how descriptive norm emergence relates to a
wider field of epistemic practice.
Bayesian models have seen much success in showing how we can learn
about nature, as we come across new evidence (see Jones and Love (2011)
for a critical review of the literature). The general process of hypothesis
formation, testing, and updating on evidence is well-established in philosophy
of science. Even children seem to be successful at learning about causal
properties and law-like regularities this way (Gopnik and Tenenbaum 2007;
Gopnik et al. 2004). Bayesian belief revision’s success in dealing with the
natural world provides a reason why we might find individuals naturally
extending this apparatus to the social world. Rather than just suppose that
people do update beliefs based on social information, we can say something
about why they update beliefs based on social information. In the absence of
any norms, there would be no social rules to follow, so no reason to motivate
the responsiveness that we have to social cues. However, if we suppose that
this responsiveness comes from a domain-general updating mechanism, then
we only need to rely on its proven success in other domains.
It is this success in other domains that explains why we would see such
a domain-general updating mechanism applied to social cases. Agents are
already accustomed to employing such cognitive machinery in a wide variety
of cases, and so the social case is just one more instance of using the same
basic tools. If anything, it would seem strange to adopt a different epistemic
method than the one used so widely in other aspects of one’s life. By look-
ing at a wider scope of human activity, we can better see how apparently
unrelated tasks can shape our responses in novel situations. The benefit of
doing this is that we find that we can get at a more substantive explanation
16Again, we would like to note that Bayesian reasoning here is just an exemplar
of domain-general reasoning about hypotheses and their evidence. Nothing hinges on
Bayesianism in particular. Rather, it is the domain-general belief revision doing the work.
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for norm emergence than what is offered in heuristic modeling. In particu-
lar, we show that descriptive norms can emerge even if agents are indifferent
between a world with no norms and a world full of them.
However, the agents do look for norms. Agents in the model look for
norms simply because they see this social situation as just another case where
empirical observation can help us uncover law-like regularities. There is no
reason to believe that the social world, unlike the natural world, lacks avail-
able evidence for how to better navigate it. However, the social situation
is unique in that by looking for regularities, regularities are created. If the
agents did not try and update their beliefs, and act in accordance with those
updated beliefs, norms could never emerge. Unlike private behaviors, norms
are public. They are things that we do because others do them. Norms
require social expectations. Since descriptive norms have no particular in-
trinsic value – they don’t solve crucial pre-existing coordination problems,
they don’t improve public morality, and they could easily have been other-
wise – they can only come about if enough people believe that they were
already there. Once this process begins, norms can start to emerge. In this
sense, they are created out of nothing, but become real enough once they
come into being.
We can see this clearly in the dynamics of the models themselves. In the
initial conditions of the model, there is no norm. People behave based on
their intrinsic propensities to act in certain ways. But simply in virtue of
looking for a pattern in what others do, we start getting a pattern in virtue
of more correlated behavior. Once that correlation gets off the ground, the
more the agents observe and update, the more they start acting in accordance
with the apparent norm. This updating system creates a positive feedback
loop. The feedback loop doesn’t always start – there aren’t always the right
conditions for it – but once it does get going, a norm comes to be purely
because people were looking for it.
In fact, our system of belief revision will, if anything, overreact to social
evidence. In the natural world, when we observe a piece of evidence for, say,
whether the moon is waxing or waning, our observation does not affect the
moon, nor the observations of others. In the social world, however, if Bob
and Carol see Alice change behavior on Monday, and because Bob sees Al-
ice change her behavior, he updates and changes his behavior as well, Carol
might now also update on Bob’s behavior. But that would just be count-
ing the first piece of information twice. We naturally assume independence
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amongst agents in normal situations. Unless we have a good reason for sup-
posing that other people’s behaviors or beliefs are correlated, we conceive of
other people as making their own decisions. This premise is often true, but
can be a catalyst in social phenomena such as norm emergence – the incorrect
assumption of independence can lead to large scale behavior change because
the first movers have far more influence than people think they have.17
Explaining descriptive norm emergence in terms of ultimate, rather prox-
imate explanations also allows us to think more systematically about why we
see the norms we do. If we focus on proximate explanations, we run the risk
of having to rationally justify each norm. We may get caught up in trying to
find ways to argue that each individual norm is utility-enhancing in the same
way that the transition from typewriters to word processors enhanced our
utilities, rather than the much more defensible claim that the general epis-
temic processes that have spawned descriptive norms are utility-enhancing.
We have argued that the system of belief revision has proven itself to be a
massive asset, and so it would naturally be extended to the social realm. It is
for this reason that we suspect that epistemic sensitivity might be generaliz-
able. Precisely because epistemic sensitivity in the natural world has proven
to be an asset, we can see how its domain might get extended to include the
social world as well. When our methods are useful, we try and use them
in more places. Our epistemic sensitivity – our disposition to act on the
rules we come to discover – can get set by our interaction with the natural
world. That we apply it to our social world should come as no surprise if
we suppose that we use the same belief revision mechanisms for both. We
would need a special reason to think that the dispositions reflected in our
epistemic sensitivity ought to be treated differently between our engagement
with the natural world and the social world. One way that this might hap-
pen is if we come to discover that being disposed to act on rules we find in
the social world is harmful in some way. As we have seen, descriptive norms
may not be particularly utility-enhancing, but they are also not particularly
utility-decreasing. By moving away from proximate explanation, and mov-
ing toward ultimate explanation, we can come to understand why descriptive
norms emerge. Not because of anything that they do for us, but because they
come about from a process that’s valuable to us in other areas of our lives.18
17As discussed earlier, it is in part due to this insight that we chose the network structure
that we did for our simulations.
18The suggested explanatory framework for the emergence of descriptive norms con-
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As we have seen, once we look at descriptive norms through the lens of a
purely epistemological procedure, transformed into a social context, we can
see why they can come to be, and persist, even if any particular descriptive
norm has no particular value. The process of norm emergence comes along
for the ride once we have a general framework for belief revision. As such, we
ought to expect (and in fact find) an accumulation of descriptive norms. This
itself can reinforce further norm emergence. Once we are in an environment
where we are aware that there are already a lot of norms, then it is rational
to be all the more vigilant for finding more. This can make us increasingly
sensitive to norm discovery. So, while descriptive norms may have started
out as a mistaken application of a domain-general belief revision system,
their accumulated presence provide a justification for why that belief revision
system ought to be applied to them after all. Once our social environment
includes descriptive norms as one if its elements, then we have good reason to
search for norms as we survey our social world. Descriptive norms may have
come to be through a mistake, but their accumulation created a self-justifying
reason for their existence.
To conclude, chapters 2 and 3 offer two different but complementary ap-
proaches to the emergence of descriptive norms. In both cases, we formulated
an agent-based model of the individual decision and studied its features in a
computer simulation, in order to observe the effect at the group level. We will
now turn to an experimental study on conformity effects in norms compli-
ance. Rather than focusing on the set of descriptive norms, the next chapter
will study whether individuals’ normative judgment is differently prone to
conformity effects according to different types of norm, namely moral, social
and decency norms. Unlike descriptive norms, the norms under consideration
involve not only empirical expectations but also normative ones, and require
an higher-level conceptualization of social organization. The empirical find-
ings constitute the first step towards the formulation of models that look at
the effects of the individuals’ decisions on the aggregate level.
ceives them as a by-product of a Bayesian updating process for detecting regularities in
the natural world. In our approach we do not presuppose the existence of descriptive
norms, nor we take these norms as input, insofar as we only assume the notion of law-like
regularities in nature. We are resting on the idea that the same mechanism that we use
to detect regularities in the natural world, when applied to our social world, amplifies the
feedback effect and in so doing facilitates the emergence of descriptive norms in society.
Chapter 4
Conformorality: a study on
conformity and normative
judgment
What is worse, stealing from your neighbor, tipping in Japan or spitting in
your glass before drinking?1 Most people will have no hesitation in answering
this question. Perhaps, they may also explain that those behaviors involve
different kinds of norms. The first situation seems to concern a moral norm,
which holds in all cultures and whose normative force does not depend on
people’s expectations and preferences. The second involves a social norm,
which holds only in particular contexts and whose normative force depends
on people’s expectations and preferences. The third example, similarly to
the first one, involves a type of behavior that is likely to elicit a wave of
disgust independent of context or people’s preferences and expectations, but
just like a social norm, it involves a matter of relatively low seriousness.
This intuitive taxonomy roughly corresponds to a distinction between
different kinds of norms, which emerges from the literature on normative
judgment in moral psychology (e.g. Bicchieri 2006; Elster 2009; Haidt et al.
1993; Nichols 2002; Turiel 1977). Although there are differences in the way
particular researchers individuate different kinds of norms, many would agree
that there are features that distinguish moral, social and what can be called
‘decency norms.’ For example, Turiel (1983, 2002) and his collaborators (e.g.
Nucci 2001; Smetana 1993) proposed that people neatly distinguish between
1This chapter is based on Lisciandra, Colombo, Nilsenova (under review).
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moral norms and social conventions2 via four main features: (in)dependence
of authority, scope, seriousness of violation, and grounds for justification.
According to this distinction, violations of moral norms would be judged
as wrong independently of the pronouncements of authorities; moral norms
would have universal scope, treated as holding in all places and at all times;
violations of moral norms would be judged as seriously bad; and justification
of such norms would refer to the harm or injustice suffered by the victim
when they are violated. Social conventions, by contrast, would be considered
to be authority-dependent, limited in scope, their violations would be less
serious than moral violations, and their justification would tend to involve
considerations such as the maintenance of social order rather than the harm
or injustice suffered by some victim.
It bears emphasis that, for Turiel and collaborators, social conventions,
unlike moral norms, are necessarily sustained by general expectations about
behavioral uniformities and other people’s beliefs. Turiel (1977) makes clear
that an assumption informing his work is that “individuals adhere to [social]
convention on the bases of (a) the expectation that others do so, and (b)
the view that conventional acts are arbitrary” (i.e., there are no intrinsic
consequences to the act) (Turiel 1977, p.93). Nucci and Turiel (1978) further
explain that “in the case of events that stimulate moral concepts it is not
necessary that there be a violation of social regulation for a child to respond to
those events as transgressions . . . In contrast, for a child to respond to a social
conventional event as a transgression there must be a perceived violation of
social regulations or general expectations” (Nucci and Turiel 1978, p.406).
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the distinction between moral
norms and social conventions emerges early in human psychology, around
three-and-a-half years of age, and is present across different cultures (e.g.
Turiel 1983, 2002; Smetana 1993; Nucci 2001). The conclusion that is often
drawn in the literature is that moral norms and social conventions, as char-
acterized by Turiel and collaborators, form different kinds of norms, which
can be neatly distinguished by human moral psychology (see for a critical
discussion Nado et al. 2009).
In agreement with the Turiel’s tradition, Bicchieri (2006) distinguishes
moral from social norms on the basis of the motivational structure that de-
termines compliance with the norm. While the preference to comply with
2In what follows, ‘social convention’ is used as a synonym for ‘social norm’
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a social norm is conditional on having expectations about other people’s
behavior and beliefs, the preference to comply with a moral norm is uncon-
ditional. “By their very nature moral norms demand (at least in principle)
an unconditional commitment . . . Under normal conditions, expectations of
other people’s conformity to a moral rule are not a good reason to obey
it. Nor is it a good reason that others expect me to follow a moral rule”
(Bicchieri 2006, pp.20-21). Bicchieri suggests that such an unconditional
preference for following moral norms is based on emotional responses that
give one independent reasons to comply with the norm (Ibid.).3
There have been some criticisms of the distinction between moral and so-
cial norm, but we accept them only partially. Recent empirical research has in
fact disputed that moral norms and social norms can be neatly distinguished
by human moral psychology. Although this research plausibly suggests that
the features that allow us to distinguish between different kinds of norms can
be more subtle and intricate than what is suggested by Turiel, or by Bicchieri
(2006), we maintain that the Turiel tradition and Bicchieri’s (2006) are on
the right track.
Kelly et al. (2007), for example, had experimental participants to evalu-
ate violations of moral norms that involved harm to others, but in cultures
and societies far away in both time and space. Such violations were often
judged to be tolerable by Kelly and colleagues’ participants. On the basis
of their experimental data, Kelly et al. (2007) concluded that skepticism is
justified about the association between harm and morality existent in the
Turiel tradition. However, Kelly et al.’s interpretation of their data is not
free from problems, as shown by further research that Sousa et al. (2009)
carried out (see also Sousa et al. 2009; Stich 2009).
Moreover, Nichols (2002) and Haidt (2001) showed that disgusting behav-
iors may be perceived as seriously bad as moral transgressions, albeit they
do not involve harm or injustice to others. According to Nichols (2004), dis-
gusting behaviors might be governed by an idiosyncratic kind of emotionally-
laden norms, distinct from moral and social norms, which we call ‘decency
norms’. We accept that decency norms are distinct kinds of norms. How-
3Interestingly, also for Turiel, emotions are prominent aspects of moral norms. Re-
porting on children’s reactions to different norm transgressions, Turiel (1977) writes: “The
feedback in the context of moral transgressions generally focused on the effects of actions
upon others and on emotional reactions. In contrast, the feedback in the context of social-
conventional transgressions focused on aspects of social order, such as rules, sanctions,
and norm violations” (Turiel 1977, p.110); see also Nucci and Turiel (1978).
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ever, we question that decency norms are moral norms in the way that Nichols
(2002) or Haidt (2001) would argue.
Furthermore, judgments about certain types of normative behaviors, but
not about others, may well be more resistant to group pressure. Intuitively,
given that moral norms are typically assumed to be non-negotiable, we might
expect that judgments about, for example, stealing, will be less easily affected
by conformity, compared to a judgment about a social norm such as tipping
or about a decency norm such as spitting in your glass before drinking.
To our knowledge, it has never been experimentally investigated whether
different kinds of norms can be distinguished by the degree to which they are
affected by peer-group judgment. Answering this question will contribute to
progress both in understanding which features allow our mind to selectively
distinguish between different kinds of norms, and specifically how social cues
impact normative judgment.
In light of previous evidence about the developmental and cultural robust-
ness of moral norms, we hypothesize that the norms that are most resistant
to peer-group judgment will be moral norms – as characterized by Turiel and
collaborators. Norms that are the least resistant to peer group judgment
will be social norms – corresponding to Turiel’s conventional norms. With
respect to decency norms, if they are found to be significantly different from
moral norms in their resistance to conformity effects, then disgust might not
be essential to moral judgment, and, at the same time it will probably be in-
sufficient to lead people to morally disapprove of a behavior where no harm or
injustice is involved. To test these hypotheses, the present study employed,
for the first time in moral psychology, Asch’s (1951, 1955) group conditioning
paradigm. We compared participants’ individual judgments concerning the
violation of moral, social, and decency norms, to the judgments the same
participants gave in the presence of other people expressing different opin-
ions. Finally, given that nonverbal, social cues such as eye contact, facial
expressions and tone of voice seem to play a crucial role in defining in-group
social identity and its prototypical (normative) behavior (Hogg and Reid
2006) as well as in facilitating reaching agreement within a group (Hiltz et
al. 1986), we hypothesized that the degree of awareness of the other persons
– so-called social presence (Short et al. 1976) – in the group conditioning
situation might have an effect on conformity. To identify the possible effects
of available nonverbal display, we tested whether being unable to see and
hear each other results in a lower degree of conformity.
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4.1 Test of Material
The test of the experimental material consisted of evaluating thirty scenar-
ios that described a transgression of some norm. The scenarios were based
on examples that are found in the philosophical and psychological litera-
ture. They included descriptions of behavior involving, for example, some
injustice or harm to other people (for what we pre-experimentally took to
be moral norms), the infringement of general expectations, or agreements
concerning, for example, fairness, reciprocity, or behavioral uniformities that
typically regulate interactions between individuals (for what we took to be
social norms), and behaviors associated with physical uncleanliness, ‘creepy-
crawlies’ or non-standard sexual practices (for decency norms). The aim was
to test if the scenarios would be interpreted by the subjects as instances of
moral, social, and decency norms, respectively.
In the test, we also considered the potential impact of personal distance
to the perpetrator of the norm transgressions. One could argue that viola-
tions that personally involve the participant could trigger emotional processes
(Greene et al. 2001, 2004) that might be difficult to evoke with a scenario-
based experimental method. If that is the case, we might expect respondents
to evaluate differently scenarios concerning strangers (typically employed in
moral psychology) to those where the perpetrator is known to the respondent.
4.1.1 Method
Participants. 68 Dutch students (57 female) were recruited from the under-
graduate student population at the Tilburg University. They were randomly
divided between two conditions and received course credits for their partici-
pation.
Design and Instrumentation. The test of the material had a 2x3 mixed de-
sign with Distance (scenario concerned a stranger as opposed to a friend/family
member) as the between-subject independent variable and Norm Type (moral,
social, decency) as the within-subject independent variable. The 30 scenar-
ios were presented in English and described violations of moral, social, and
decency norms (ten scenarios per Norm Type, see table 4.1 for examples
and table 4.2 for a list of the transgressions employed, classified per type of
norm).
The participants were asked to evaluate the scenarios with respect to the
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Norm Type Scenario
Moral One day Lauren invites Aaron to her place for tea. Aaron
accepts even though he doesn’t know Lauren very well. They are
having their tea, when Lauren has a sexual urge. She wants
to have sex with Aaron. Aaron is not willing, he tells Lauren,
tries to fend her off, but he can’t. Lauren tears off Aaron’s clothes
and she has sex with him.
On a scale between 1 and 7 how strongly do you approve/disapprove
of Lauren having sex with Aaron?
Social Michiru, Mauro and Robert are at the pub together. Michiru buys
the first round of drinks for everybody. Mauro buys the second.
When they have finished their second drink, Robert walks to the
bar and buys a drink only for himself. Michiru and Mauro buy their
third drink for themselves.
On a scale between 1 and 7 how strongly do you approve/disapprove
of Robert buying a drink only for himself?
Decency Susan usually has cereals for breakfast. One morning she realizes
she finished her favorite cereals. She has only an old pack with
grubs and insects inside. She puts them in a bowl and microwaves
it first to kill the germs. Then she eats them.
On a scale between 1 and 7 how strongly do you approve/disapprove
of Susan eating cereals with insects and grubs for breakfast?
Table 4.1: Examples of experimental scenarios involving a violation of nor-
mative behavior.
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Norm Type Scenario
Moral 1. Getting drunk while being the designated driver
2. Wife cheating on her loving husband
3. Not paying taxes in Italy
4. Catching frogs and pouring boiling oil on them
5. Woman forcing a man to have casual intercourse
6. Harming the environment to increase profits
7. Buying a luxury car during famine in Ethiopia
8. Not voting in EU elections with a low turnout
9. Keeping slaves 200 years ago
10. Downloading music from the Internet illegally
Social 11. Having a sexual intercourse in a mosque
12. Not taking vengeance for one’s sister on Corsica
13. Coming to a dinner without a gift for the hosts
14. Enjoying rounds of drinks but not contributing
15. Not leaving a tip in a restaurant in the U.S.
16. Playing cards in a church during a funeral
17. Not sharing gained money during a game
18. Making a phone call in a cinema
19. Playing further after an opponent has been injured in a game
20. Leaving a shopping cart in the line to shop further
Decency 21. Eating parts of the deceased relatives’ bodies
22. Wearing a sweater that once belonged to Hitler
23. Brother and sister making love
24. Eating one’s dog after it was killed by a car
25. Eating cereals with insects for breakfast
26. Sexual partners urinating on each other
27. Bathing in chicken blood
28. Sheep ranchers having sex with sheep
29. Growing worms in the bedroom and eating them
30. Spitting in glasses before drinking
Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 4.2: Violations involved in the scenarios classified according to the
Type of Norm.
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following four items, each operationalized in terms of a 7-point scale anchored
at the ends with (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly agree: Badness (‘X’s
behavior is very bad’), Disgust (‘What X did is nauseating’), Time/Place
(‘In a different time/place, it is OK to do what X did’) and Authority (‘If the
law allows it, it is OK to do what X did’). These items were based on the
properties identified by Turiel (1977), Kelly et al. (2007) and Nichols (2002)
as characteristic features of the different types of norms. In the Stranger
condition, the scenarios concerned unknown individuals with invented names;
in the Friend/Family condition, the names were replaced with phrases such
as ‘your room-mate’, ‘your best friend’ or ‘your parents’.
Procedure. The test was administered online and presented as a study of
Dutch taboo subjects. The participants were invited to read each scenario
as if it were describing a situation that actually happened.
4.1.2 Results
We analyzed the results with mixed ANOVAs with Norm Type and Distance
as independent variables and the score on each of the four items as the de-
pendent variable. The data showed no significant main effects of Distance
for Badness, F (1,66) = 2.945 , p = .091, for Disgust, F (1,66)<1, p = .579,
for Time/Place, F (1,66)<1 , p = .620, and for Authority, F (1,66)<1, p =
.521. There were also no significant interaction effects between the variables
Norm Type and Distance for Disgust, F (2,132)<1, p = .430, for Time/Place,
F (2,132) = 2.850, p = .061, and for Authority, F (2,132) = 1.959, p = .145.
There was an interaction effect between Norm Type and Distance for Bad-
ness, F (2,132) = 4.527, p = .013, η2p = .06.
These results indicate that scenarios that involved the participants’ friends
and family members were not judged differently than the scenarios involving
strangers. The scales evaluated for each scenario distinguished between the
three Norm Types as summarized in table 4.3.
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Item Moral SD Social SD Decency SD η2p
Badness 5.3 0.60 4.5 0.72 5.0 1.10 .30*
Disgust 4.9 0.73 3.7 0.96 5.9 0.79 .84*
Time/Place 2.9 0.72 3.7 0.86 3.3 1.10 .28*
Authority 2.9 0.61 3.5 0.81 2.9 1.00 .21*
Note.* p<.05
Table 4.3: Summary of the mean participants’ judgments in the two survey
conditions per item, measured on a 7-point disagree/agree- scale (N=64).
For the property Badness, Decency and Time/Place, the three types of
norms differed significantly from each other. The perception of Badness,
F (2,126) = 25.161, p <.001, η2p = .29, differed form moral norms compared
to decency norm (p = .008) and social norms (p < .001), as well as for decency
norms compared to social norms (p = .004).
With respect to Disgust, F (2,126) = 174.631, p <.001, η2p = .74, all the
norms differed from each other with p < .001. Time/Place, F (2,126) =
15.430, p < .001, η2p = .20, could distinguish between moral and decency
norms (p = .006) and social norms (p <.001), but not between decency and
social norms (p = .117). For Authority, a pairwise comparison showed a
difference between moral and social violations (p < .001), and decency and
social violations (p = .001), but no significant difference between moral and
decency violations (p = .870).
Finally, we inspected the correlations between the scores assigned to sce-
narios within a Norm Type, focusing on the properties that in the literature
are assumed to be relevant for distinguishing between the norms, to wit
Badness for moral norms, Disgust for decency norms, and Time/Place and
Authority for social norms. The analysis showed no outliers within the cate-
gories, i.e., scenarios that would be negatively correlated with other scenarios
in the category with respect to the distinguishing property. The Cronbach’s
alpha coefficients (measures of internal consistency of the scales) were α =
.62 for moral violations on the Badness scale, α = .73 for Disgust, and α =
.60 for Time/Place and α = .56 for Authority, showing the highest internal
consistency with respect to judgments of Badness and Disgust. In the case
of decency violations, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was relatively high on
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all the four scales, with = α .81 on the Disgust-scale, α = .85 for Badness, α
= .85 for Time/Place and α = .84 for Authority. For social norm violations,
there was an acceptable internal consistency for all the four scales, with α
= .72 on the Time/Place-scale, α = .75 on the Authority-scale, α = .80 on
Disgust and α = .68 on Badness.
4.1.3 Discussion
The results of the material test show that the characteristic properties of
three types of norm violations, which have been identified in the literature
(the seriousness of the violation, its dependence on time/place and on an
authority, and the feeling of disgust it evokes) distinguish between the sce-
nario types employed in the test and thus validate the original classification
of the scenarios, which was based on the literature. The participants were
not more sensitive to scenarios involving a familiar person compared to those
concerning a stranger and the distinction was not taken into consideration in




Participants. 97 Dutch native speakers (66 female), all with a good com-
mand of English, between the ages of 19 and 49, were recruited from the
undergraduate student population at Tilburg University and received course
credit for their participation.
Design and Instrumentation. The experiment had a mixed 3x3 design,
with Norm Type (moral, social, decency) as the within-subject variable and
Social Presence (high, low and control) as the between-subject variable. The
questionnaire consisted of the thirty short scenarios described above and 10
4The first part of the study has been conducted in order to get independent evidence
about the norm taxonomy employed in the actual experiment. In this way, it has been
shown that the distinction between social, moral and decency norms is not only based on
intuitive criteria, but –more carefully– on certain characteristic features of each group of
norms. Another viable option could be to run a cluster analysis in order to observe whether
the clustering of the scenarios on the basis of their sensitivity to group pressure corresponds
to the initial classification. Thanks to Jason Alexander and Jan-Willem Romeijn for
pointing this out to me.
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distractors. The distractor items had content similar to the experimental
items in that they involved different kinds of norm violations.
The participant’s judgment was measured on a 7-point scale anchored at
the ends with (1) ‘strongly disapprove’ and (7) ‘strongly approve’, with par-
ticipants indicating their acceptability judgment for each scenario, first in an
individually completed online questionnaire and, two weeks later, in a group
condition with three confederates. In the online version of the questionnaire,
participants were also asked to indicate for each scenario if they were certain
of their judgment (yes/no).
For the thirty experimental items, the confederates’ answers employed
in the group condition were chosen using the mean of the participants’ an-
swers in the first measurement, with two scale points added to the mean
in the ‘least desired direction’. For each item, the ‘least desired direction’
was operationalized on the basis of which half of the scale (i.e. either the
‘disapprove’ or ‘approve’ half) the participants used less often in the indi-
vidual condition. The confederate answers were unanimous on the thirty
experimental items and differed for the ten distractor items. In the control
condition, participants merely filled out the online questionnaire twice with
a two-week period in between. For the first measurement in the individual
condition, we used two sequences of the online questionnaire to test for pos-
sible order effects. In the second sequence, the questions were presented in
reverse order.
Procedure. In the group condition with high social presence, the partici-
pants were seated together with three confederates and they could see each
other’s expressions and hear each other’s voice. In total, 24 students, both
male and female, acted as confederates. The experimental leader (a female
for half of the trials and a man for the other half) read each scenario and
the participants gave their answers in the order: confederate 1 - confederate
2 - participant - confederate 3. The participants were informed that the an-
swers they gave online were lost due to a server error and had to be collected
again. In order to avoid differences in cognitive load between the first and
the second measurement, the participants were supplied with the text of the
scenarios on paper.
In the condition with low social presence, the participants were seated in
front of a computer screen in the same room as the confederates but could
not see their faces. In order to exclude vocal cues, they all indicated their
judgments for each scenario by selecting their answer on the screen, where
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both the scenarios and the answers of the confederates were presented. At the
end of each session, the participants were interviewed and debriefed. None
of the participants reported having difficulties in judging the scenarios.
4.2.2 Results
A Mann-Whitney test of judgments per scenario collected during the first
measurement revealed no effect of presentation order on participants’ judg-
ments. The data from the first measurement in all three conditions, summa-
rized as the mean value of the participants’ judgments per scenario, were used
to examine the homogeneity of variance for the three types of norms. The
Levene Statistic showed that the assumption of equal variances was valid,
indicating no systematic differences in answer distributions.
In order to test if all three types of scenarios were judged with the same
certainty, we first compared the categorical data indicating participants’ cer-
tainty of their approval judgments. There was no significant difference be-
tween the three scenario types, χ2(2) = .16, p = .920; for most scenarios
(92.7%), the participants indicated themselves to be certain of their judg-
ment.
In the subsequent analyses comparing the first and the second measure-
ment, we excluded cases where the participant had the same judgment during
the first measurement as the confederates in the group condition (13% of the
total of 2910 experimental trials, distributed equally over the three Norm
Types).
We calculated Conformity (C) using the approval judgments given by the
participants in the individual (M1) and the group condition (M2) and the
confederates’ opinion (O), as C = |O −M1| − |O −M2|. A positive value of
C represents instances where the participant’s judgment shifted closer to the
confederates’ opinion, a negative number stands for cases where the distance
increased and 0 for cases where the distance remained the same.
Given that the dependent variable Conformity was not normally dis-
tributed (Shapiro Wilk’s test < 0.5), we used nonparametric tests through-
out. We first examined whether male and female participants differed in
their overall Conformity scores in the two conditions involving confederates.
A Mann-Whitney U showed no significant effect for gender (U = 374.00, z
= -1.43, p +.154). We used the Kruskal Wallis test to analyze the differ-
ence between the experimental conditions with high and low social presence
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and the control condition. A Mann-Whitney test with Bonferroni correction
showed that the condition with high social presence differed from the Control
condition for all three Norm Types, as well as the Total Conformity.
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The condition with low social presence differed from the Control condition
in the case of Social Conformity and the Total Conformity, but not for Moral
and Decency Conformity (see table 4.4).
High SP Low SP
Conformity U p r U p r
Moral 297.000 .01 -.328 397.000 .13 -.188
Social 88.000 .00 -.701 297.500 .00 -.356
Decency 184.000 .00 -.529 464.000 .56 -.074
Total 116.000 .00 -.650 323.500 .01 -.311
Note. df = 2. SP = Social Presence
Table 4.4: Mann-Whitney tests for the conditions with high social presence
(N=33) and with low social presence (N=35) compared to the Control con-
dition (N=29).
The medians for the three types of norms in the three sets of conditions
are reported in table 4.5.
In order to examine the difference between the three Norm Types (moral,
social, and decency) in detail, we used the Friedman test to compare the level
of Conformity separately in the two experimental conditions, with high and
low social presence. The analysis showed that the three Norm Types differed
only in the condition with high social presence (χ2(2) = 7.09, p <.05), but not
in the condition with low social presence (χ2(2) = 2.97, p = .227) - see table
4.5. In the condition with high social presence, participants conformed the
most to the scenarios describing social violations (Mdn = .600), compared
to decency violations (Mdn = .546) and moral violations (Mdn = .400).
Wilcoxon tests with the Bonferroni correction (effects reported at a .0167
level of significance) showed that Conformity to judgments of moral violations
differed from Conformity to social (p= .003, r = -.471) and decency violations
(p = .008, r = -.417), but Conformity to judgments of social violations did
not significantly differ from Conformity to decency violations (p = .187, r =
-.160).
Finally, we ran a secondary analysis of the consistency of answers across
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Condition Statics
Conformity HighSP LowSP Control X2 p
Moral .40 .20 .00 7.100 .03
Social .60 .20 .00 33.998 .00
Decency .55 .00 .10 21.065 .00
Total .52 .16 .00 30.835 .00
Note. df = 2. SP = Social Presence
Table 4.5: Median Conformity differences in the three experimental condi-
tions (low social presence, high social presence and control) by Norm Type
(N=97). The scores express the change in distance to the confederate’s opin-
ion, higher score indicating higher conformity (0 = no change).
measurements, calculated as the absolute difference between the participant’s
first and second measurement (independent of the confederates’ answers).
The results showed that, similarly to the Conformity measure, the stability
of answers was higher for moral scenarios compared to the other two types;
Norm Type: F (2, 188) = 9.95, p < .001, η2(2)p = .10; Condition: F (2,
94) = 6.24, p = .003, η2(2)p = .12; Norm Type * Condition n.s. A pairwise
comparison analysis showed a significant difference between moral and social,
and moral and decency norms, but no difference between social and decency
norms (see Table 4.6 for means and standard deviations).5
5Also, a further analysis has been conducted which showed that no memory effects
could explain the higher stability of moral judgments as compared to judgments of other
kinds of norm.
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Condition
N With SP Without SP Control
Norm
Type
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Moral 10 0.81 0.38 0.78 0.32 0.63 0.34
Social 10 1.08 0.41 0.92 0.43 0.73 0.31
Decency 10 1.06 0.50 0.82 0.31 0.76 0.43
Note. df = 2. SP= Social Presence
Table 4.6: Median Conformity differences in the three experimental condi-
tions (low social presence, high social presence and control) by Norm Type
(N=97). The scores express the change in distance to the confederate’s opin-
ion, higher score indicating higher conformity (0 = no change)
4.3 General Discussion
Earlier research in psychology has examined, on the one hand, the effects of
authority on obedience and norm compliance (Milgram 1963), in-group/out-
group effects on moral behavior (Tajfel 1981), and the consequences of emo-
tional cues on people’s normative judgments (Schelling 1978; Wheatley and
Haidt 2005). On the other hand, research studies on humans and nonhuman
primates have shown that both species tend to adjust their behavior and be-
liefs toward others in their social circles (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Whiten
et al. 2005). In humans, conformity can affect judgments ranging from per-
ceptual line-length estimates Asch (1951) to more complex behaviors, such
as energy saving (Schultz et al. 2007).
Combining both threads of research on normative judgment and confor-
mity effects in an original way, our experiment focused on understanding the
effects of peer pressure on individuals’ normative judgments. The results
of our experiment indicate that while all normative judgments tend to be
affected by peer-group judgment to some degree, the effect is the strongest
for social and decency norms, which are most likely to be influenced by
peer-group conditioning. Moreover, the effect is especially pronounced in
situations involving a higher degree of awareness of others, operationalized
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in terms of the availability of nonverbal display. The degree of conformity to
other people’s normative judgment as such can then be used to independently
motivate the distinction between moral norms and social norms proposed by
Turiel and collaborators and by Bicchieri. Our findings are congruent with
previous research both on conformity effects in computer-mediated commu-
nication (Smilowitz et al. 1988; Bordia 1997; Cinnirella and Green 2007;
Laporte et al. 2010), as well as with studies conducted by Bicchieri (2008)
and Cialdini et al. (1991) on the effects of expectations about other people’s
compliance with a norm.
To explain our main results, it can be suggested that the predisposition
we have towards conformism to common behaviors and shared opinions of our
own group is counterbalanced by the robust influence that a specific kind of
norm, that is moral norms, has on our mind. Hence, the degree of dependency
on other people’s judgments makes it possible to reliably distinguish moral
norms from different types of norms. On this basis, it can be suggested that
moral norms constitute a natural kind in human moral psychology.
Furthermore, the fact that decency norms appear to be less stable than
moral norms lends support to critical reviews according to which there is
weak evidence that disgust is a moralizing emotion (Huebner et al. 2009).
Although disgust may be implicated in moral judgment, it is probably neither
sufficient nor necessary for moralization to occur (Royzman 2009). A number
of variables, including group size, group composition in terms of gender and
age, as well as cultural background of the participants may influence the
outcome of group conditioning experiments and should be explored in future
studies of conformity to judgments of norms. However, if human psychology
is selectively sensitive to recognize and implement moral norms, which might
constitute a cognitive domain robust to conformity effects, then our main
result should be found across different groups and cultures.
One important issue for future research is that a more fine-grained anal-
ysis of the content of the scenarios used in our study is necessary in order
to make firmer, and more specific claims about the psychological nature of
distinct kinds of norms. Some of the items we used might be revised so
as to enrich them with more context, which may be relevant to judge the
kind of transgression involved. For example, privacy and prudential consid-
erations that a decency scenario might activate are relevant to make firmer
conclusions about decency norms. With respect to privacy, if some of the
transgressions of decency norms were interpreted as being done in the pres-
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ence of other people, they would involve offense, which can be considered as
a specific type of harm. This may make some of the decency scenarios not
that different from the moral ones (cf. Royzman 2011). With respect to the
prudential issue, some of the decency scenarios might have been interpreted
prudentially, in terms of the unhealthy consequences for the perpetrator,
rather than disgusting practices.
The language of the experiment might also be a factor; in our study,
we presented English scenarios to Dutch participants. Even though their
knowledge of English was good, the fact that they were evaluating norm
transgressions in a non-native language may have reduced the impact of our
manipulation (Puntoni et al. 2008). Arguably, this might affect decency
norms more than moral ones.
Additional research is also needed to validate the scenario-based tech-
nique employed here by linking it to behavioral data collected in natural and
simulated (game) settings (van Lankveld et al. 2011), possibly using method-
ology that has been previously employed to determine personality profiles.
Chapter 5
Towards a methodological
account of robustness analysis
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, a set of models for the emergence of norms and
a series of experiments on norms compliance have been presented and the
robustness of their results investigated. The method of testing whether the
same predictions follow from a set of different theoretical or experimental as-
sumptions is known as robustness analysis. Correspondingly, the predictions
of a model or an experiment are said to be robust if they hold true even when
some of the assumptions, from which they are derived, have been challenged
and replaced by others.
Whereas in the experimental sciences robustness analysis is used as a test
of the effect of possible confounders on the empirical results, the arguments
in support of robustness analysis in non-experimental contexts are often left
implicit or are unreflectively imported from the experimental sciences. This
final chapter will be dedicated to an examination of the logic behind this
practice as it is used in theoretical models.
Intuitively, the general idea behind robustness analysis is as follows: Sup-
pose that we have a model, based on a number of initial assumptions, from
which a number of predictions are derived. If the initial assumptions are
simplified representations of the real-world phenomenon, it is natural to ask
how the predictions of the model can apply to the real-world phenomenon,
where such simplifications do not hold. One strategy is to replace the initial
assumptions with different ones, to observe whether the predictions hold true
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across conditions. Consistency of the results would suggest that the unrealis-
tic assumptions were irrelevant to the final result; inconsistency would show
that the predictions were not independent of the specific initial assumptions.
A classic example of robust explanation is Schelling’s segregation model
(Schelling 1978). This model describes the dynamics that lead to racial seg-
regation within social groups. More generally, it applies to any situation
where individuals have preferences that tend to generate social clusters, i.e
different tastes, language, social status, sex, age, etc. Schelling’s model can
be represented by means of a checkerboard, with dimes and pennies, stand-
ing respectively for a certain metropolitan area and for the individuals of
two different groups, for example Blacks and Whites. The behavior of the
individuals is determined by a decisional rule that makes them move from
one place to another, until the composition of the neighborhood meets their
preferences. As it turns out, regardless of their initial distribution in the
metropolitan area, Black and White citizens will end up being segregated in
two different parts of the city, as a consequence of their preference for hav-
ing at least half their neighbors of their own color. Interestingly, the model
predicts segregation not as a consequence of the preference of the individuals
for segregation itself, but as a by-product of their preference for having a
few neighbors of the same ethnicity. With respect to robustness, the fact
that segregation occurs across different initial positions is considered to be
a virtue of the model, as it suggests that the result does not depend on one
specific assumption, i.e. a simplified representation of the distribution of the
individuals in space.
The robustness of Schelling’s model has been tested under a number of
different assumptions, other than initial position. For example, Bruch and
Mare (1989) have shown that segregation occurs under different updating
rules, structures of neighborhood, and alternative choice functions. Muldoon
et al. (2012) have shown that segregation takes place even when the individ-
uals prefer to be in the minority group of their neighborhood. Overall, these
studies are meant to establish whether the same effect follows under more
plausible assumptions than the original ones, such as more fine-grained util-
ity functions or less stylized metropolitan areas. In this respect, the relation
identified by one model is more robust than another, to the extent that it is
resistant to a larger set of variations in the underlying features of the system
being investigated.
In the philosophy of science literature, robustness analysis of scientific
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models has been either defended or rejected as a confirmatory device and the
core of the dispute is about whether this practice can guide the comparison
between a model and the empirical world. The critics consider the analysis to
be an a priori method of inquiry, which only assesses the effects of variations
in the assumptions of a model on a theoretical level. Its advocates value
it as an effective way of increasing confidence in the theoretical predictions,
before or when it is not possible to test them against the empirical data.
More generally, the epistemological problem of robustness analysis concerns
what we can conclude from the stability of our predictions through changes
in the assumptions from which they are derived.
In a recent paper, Woodward (2006) distinguishes various senses in which
the notion of robustness has been used across scientific areas and claims that
each one has its own criteria of justification. The major distinction he draws
is between experimental robustness and theoretical robustness. The former
refers to the stability of a certain result across multiple experimental tech-
niques, or variations of the same experimental setting, where the consistency
of the measurement outcomes is taken to confirm the initial hypothesis. The
latter applies to theoretical models and investigates whether the same pre-
dictions can be derived from a set of different assumptions.1 Within the
theoretical domain, a further distinction has been drawn by Weisberg and
Reisman (2008) between:
1. parameter robustness, which refers to variations in the initial conditions
or in the values assigned to the parameters of the model;
2. structural robustness, which refers to changes in the parameters in-
cluded in the model;
3. representational robustness, which refers to modifications in the formal
structure in which the model has been implemented.
Throughout this chapter, it will be argued that even within the context of
theoretical robustness, different criteria of justifications apply across differ-
1This is however a broad distinction, which does not take account of the variety of
uses of robustness analysis across scientific domains. For example, in the study of complex
systems, robustness analysis is combined with sensitivity analysis as a method of quanti-
fying the effect of uncertainty at the level of the parameters on the final predictions. In
statistics, robust estimators are those unaffected by outliers in the data. More on this
can be found in the literature on robustness in econometrics (Leamer 1983) and climate
sciences (Parker 2011; Pirtle 2010).
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ent cases. More specifically, the motivations for robustness analysis as a
method of proving that a certain result is robust, with respect to different
assumptions about the system being investigated, are different from those
related to different ways of modeling the same component within a model.
The former, which concerns the first two senses of robustness in Weisberg’s
classification, is a method of observing whether and how the introduction of
new ingredients into a model affects its predictions. The latter, which corre-
sponds to Weisberg’s third category, is a method of observing whether and
how different ways of expressing the same ingredient affects the predictions.
In the literature, however, the difference between the criteria behind these
two senses of robustness has not been sufficiently appreciated and this has
generated misunderstandings about the nature and scope of robustness anal-
ysis. The justifications in favor of one approach are not by default relevant
to the other and one sense of robustness analysis will not be weakened if the
other is shown to be untenable.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Sec.2, I start by delineating
the concept of robustness analysis and briefly present the main arguments
for and against this method. I suggest that the lack of agreement in the
scientific community about the epistemological status of robustness analysis
depends partly on the absence of a unified account of robustness analysis
across domains. In Sec.3, I argue in support of robustness analysis as a
means of testing the role of the assumptions of a model, with an example
from population biology, and I illustrate the relevance of this practice in
the field. In Sec.4, I present a case study from economic geography, where
robustness analysis is considered to be a method of testing whether the same
result can be derived from different tractability assumptions, namely different
mathematical formulations of the same factor. I conclude by pointing out a
number of difficulties that emerge from the robustness analysis of tractability
assumptions. I claim that the objections to robustness analysis in the latter
case do not undermine the previous ones (Sec.5).
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5.2 For and Against Robustness
Analysis
In the experimental sciences, the robustness of a certain result – with respect
to changes in the experimental setup – is considered to be a way of testing
the result achieved in the laboratory and of ruling out the effects of possible
confounders (see e.g. Guala 2005; Guala and Mittone 2005; Hacking 1983).2
In the case of non-experimental science, the analogous question is whether
the robustness of the model’s predictions – with respect to changes in the
initial assumptions – is a means of confirming the theoretical predictions.
The two tests proceed on similar lines: while doing experiments, scientists
modify the experimental setting in some aspects in order to observe whether
relevant effects follow; in the case of models, scientists modify the theoretical
structure and analyze the consequences of this change.3
Robustness analysis, in experimental contexts, is usually not considered
to be a test of the external validity of the phenomenon under scrutiny, but
mainly of the effect observed in the laboratory. By contrast, it has been
contended that – in the case of scientific models – where there is no such dis-
tinction between the experimental setup and the world, robustness analysis
can provide support for the theoretical predictions of the models. The ratio-
nale behind this claim is that robustness analysis offers a means of addressing
the problem of the unrealistic assumptions of theoretical models, which is the
problem of how scientific models can represent the empirical world, despite
being based on idealizations and abstractions that do not literally match with
the distinguishing features of the phenomenon under consideration (Frigg and
Hartmann 2012). In physics, for example, the motion of a simple pendulum
is explained assuming a uniform gravitational force, even though there is no
2A classic example where robustness analysis has proved to be successful in an ex-
perimental context is Perrin’s determination of Avogadro’s number, which in turn was
considered to be crucial to assess the existence of molecules (Perrin 1923). The consis-
tency of the result through different and independent methods of measurement was decisive
in ruling out the possibility that that result was the effect of one specific measurement
tool. In this chapter, I distinguish – within the realm of the empirical sciences – between
experimental robustness, as a method of testing inferential relations through changes in
the assumptions of the experimental setup, and measurement robustness, as a method of
measuring the properties of physical entities through different measurement tools.
3See Guala (2005, pp. 224-229) for a detailed distinction between the notion of ro-
bustness analysis and external validity.
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such thing as uniform gravitational force. In the model, the earth is repre-
sented as a perfectly homogeneous sphere, there are no other celestial bodies
that exert a gravitational influence on the pendulum and no other kinds of
forces, apart from the gravitational ones, that affect its motion. This way of
proceeding is not necessarily detrimental to the predictions of the model. If
it can be shown that the same predictions follow from different assumptions,
corresponding to different degrees of proximity to the real phenomenon, then
these predictions are not necessarily undermined by the initial unrealistic
assumptions.
This sort of analysis, however, is beset with difficulties. Part of the prob-
lem is to ascertain whether the role of the assumptions in a theoretical model
is as simple as stated above. Whereas, in the case of the pendulum, the role
of the omitted factors is negligible, in other circumstances it is not so obvious
whether the simplifying assumptions are not excluding relevant features of
the system under analysis. More generally, the critics of robustness analysis
(Cartwright 1991; Odenbaugh and Alexandrova 2011; Orzack and Sober 1993;
Sugden 2001) raise a number of objections to the claim that this method can
boost confidence in an hypothesis. First, they maintain that robustness anal-
ysis is a non-experimental method of inquiry, at odds with the fundamental
principles of scientific method, according to which our hypotheses should be
tested against the empirical evidence rather than against a priori reasoning.
Examining the role of assumptions by substituting them with new ones is
only a way of remaining in the theoretical sphere of a model.
Further reasons to be skeptical of robustness analysis are that varying
assumptions might all lead to the same result, which is itself wrong: it is
not sufficient that the outcomes of different analyses are consistent with each
other for them to be true. In this regard, Orzack and Sober discuss the
following case: “Consider, for example, all models in which natural selection
is said to be the only force acting on a population. This assumption has
a consequence that population size is infinite. Accordingly, this is a robust
prediction for this set of models. This gives us no reason, however, to think
that populations in nature really are infinite.” (Orzack and Sober 1993, p.538)
Yet another reason for skepticism is that lack of robustness does not nec-
essarily imply the falsity of an hypothesis. For example, a certain economic
model whose predictions turn out to be accurate when applied to a specific
geographic region might fail with respect to another. In such a situation, it
is not clear why the fragility of the result should invalidate the model in the
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first place. The inconsistency could be taken as proof, either of the fact that
the model does not capture the general dynamic of the economy, or of the
fact that the market is simply different in the two contexts. More generally,
if a certain hypothesis is shown to be sensitive to changes in its theoretical
structure, it does not follow that the hypothesis is to be rejected, since its
fragility might reflect a genuine feature of the system (Hoover 2006).
Finally, the critics of robustness analysis ask for a more accurate speci-
fication of the relation between a certain result and the set of assumptions
from which it is derived (Aldrich 1989). Do the assumptions have to cover all
possible configurations of the system under scrutiny, i.e. are they mutually
exclusive and exhaustive? What if the phenomenon is found to follow from
them only with a certain probability? For example, suppose that Schelling’s
segregation model were to predict that separation by color would occur only
according to a number of spatial configurations, i.e. only with a certain prob-
ability. How high should this probability be in order for the phenomenon to
be considered robust?
Against these objections, the advocates of robustness analysis (Kuorikoski
et al. 2010, 2012; Weisberg 2006; Weisberg and Reisman 2008) defend it
as an effective guide to scientific research. Consider again the segregation
model: if the process under consideration is shown to be independent of a
number of specifications of the system under scrutiny, then scientists can
remain agnostic about the details of the problem without this undermining
the result. This turns out to be a crucial feature in all those areas of research
where scientists cannot know the exact configuration of the system they
intend to explain. For example, in evolutionary game theory, a standard
objection to the validity of certain results about the emergence of cooperative
behaviors in human societies concerns their lack of robustness with respect
to the individuals’ cognitive constraints (Skyrms 1996; Sugden 1986; D’Arms
1998). A limitation on the kind of possible strategies that can be transmitted
across generations is the cognitive load they impose on individuals; thus, a
result will not be considered significant if it does not stand a test of robustness
that takes these limitations into account.
More generally, the partisans of robustness analysis maintain that, even
if the method does not make it possible to derive the occurrence of a certain
phenomenon deductively, this is not a reason to reject it. The situation is the
same as in science in general: inductive inferences always require an inferen-
tial leap. In the case of robustness analysis the question is whether a robust
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result confirms an hypothesis more strongly than a non-robust one. Certainly,
they argue, we do not want to accept a practice that is not epistemically jus-
tified, but at the same time we do not want to abandon a methodology that
might increase confidence in our hypotheses. On this analysis, the criteria for
robustness – such as, that the underlying assumptions must be exhaustive
and mutually exclusive – could even be too strict, and lead to the dismissal of
certain results that it would be more reasonable to accept (on this argument,
cf. Woodward 2006).
Overall, the divergence of views between the advocates and the critics
of robustness analysis appears very radical: either scientists are operating
on the basis of non-justified procedures, or the reasons in support of these
procedures have not been sufficiently elucidated. So far, the debate between
the opposing sides has not led to conclusive answers. Part of the difficulty
in finding agreement lies in the fact that robustness analysis has been used
across disciplines, in each of them in conformity with its own characteristic
methods. Applying arguments that are appropriate for a certain context to a
different one may have made the criteria that justify this method unclear. In
the next sections, different examples of robustness analysis will be provided
with the goal of highlighting the distinctive criteria behind them.
5.3 A Case Study of Robustness from
Population Biology
An example that helps illustrate how robustness analysis works in biology
and related disciplines is provided by Weisberg (2006, 2007), and Weisberg
and Reisman (2008) with the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model. This is a
mathematical model which analyzes the dynamics between prey and preda-
tors with respect to the size of each population. The Lotka-Volterra model
is based on two coupled differential equations and one property derived from
them is the Volterra principle. This shows that the introduction of an exter-
nal cause of death in the system, such as a pesticide, affecting both the prey
and the predator, determines a lower decrease in the growth rate of the prey
than in that of the predator.
The Lotka-Volterra model relies on a number of assumptions: for example
that there is no scarcity of food in the environment. This means that popu-
lation density is not considered initially as one of the factors influencing the
Chapter 5. Towards a methodological account of robustness analysis 85
growth rate of each population, even though it is well known that it usually
affects the process. The reason for omitting this factor is mainly to focus
on the relation between the prey and the predators rather than on other
external features. After deriving the properties of the model in its simplified
version, a test of robustness is made by introducing a new assumption repre-
senting the carrying capacity of the environment. The Volterra principle still
holds once the population density factor is added to the model. Moreover,
the principle also holds under other realistic features, which were missing
from the original formulation, such as a limit in the number of prey for each
predator (see Weisberg and Reisman 2008). Other properties, however, are
shown to be sensitive to the change: for example, whereas originally the os-
cillations representing the abundance of the two groups in their ecological
system were stable, this was no longer the case after the introduction of the
population density factor. Because the Volterra principle holds under a more
realistic assumption, and other features of the baseline model do not, then –
Weisberg argues – we have more reason to accept the robust principle than
the non-robust properties.
Weisberg also points out that the robustness of the Volterra principle can
be tested within different theoretical frameworks, i.e. not only by means of
analytic proofs but also in the context of agent-based models (Weisberg and
Reisman 2008). In this case, the way of proceeding in order to verify whether
the principle is independent of population density is to assign different values
to this factor and to observe whether the final result is affected by this
change. Whether by computer simulations or formal analysis, the point of
the procedure is to test whether a certain relation holds when modifying the
assumptions about some features of the environment, which characterize the
phenomenon under scrutiny, in order to see whether they affect the dynamics
of the phenomenon under study.
One question that emerges from this study is to what extent it is in the
hands of the modeler to formulate the new variables in such a way that they
will affect (or not) the previous results. The answer to this question, however,
is not specifically directed to robustness analysis, but involves the practice of
model building in general. It is part of the elaboration of a model to assess
whether the predictions are robust to changes in its unrealistic assumptions.
Changes in the assumptions may have interesting effects, as may the variables
that were initially considered to be causally relevant to the phenomenon un-
der consideration. Just as it is part of experimental practice to check whether
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a certain effect is determined by the specific conditions of the experimental
setup, it is part of theoretical practice to check whether the predictions de-
pend on the idealized setup of the model. In both cases, in order to test the
experimental and the theoretical predictions, the burden of proof lies in the
empirical investigation of real-world phenomena, but robustness analysis is
a preliminary to empirical investigation. Even when theoretical models are
not built with the intention or the possibility that they will be tested exper-
imentally, robustness analysis is inherent in the formulation of the model in
the first place, as it provides an indication of how relevant variables might
affect the predictions.
In this respect, the Lotka-Volterra prey-predator model offers an example
of robustness analysis as a method of finding out whether the theoretical
predictions are affected or not by varying assumptions about the system
in which the phenomenon under investigation takes place. In a different
way, robustness analysis has also been deployed as a method of observing
whether a certain result is insensitive to different tractability assumptions,
namely different mathematical formulations of the same factor in a model.
In the next section, an example of this kind of analysis will be presented and
discussed.
5.4 Robustness Analysis of Tractability
Assumptions
Weisberg and Reisman (2008) have introduced the term representational ro-
bustness to describe a test of the consistency of predictions across differ-
ent mathematical approaches. For example, in the Lotka-Volterra model,
the same phenomenon has been analyzed both by differential equations and
agent-based models. Similarly, Colyvan and Ginzburg (2003) have suggested
that the predator-prey model should be treated by second-order differential
equations rather than by first-order differential equations, since the former
provides a better description of the change in the population’s growth rate.
When considering whether to adopt a certain mathematical structure, or
a specific mathematical assumption within the same model, the purpose is
the same, i.e. to find an effective combination of mathematical tractability
and expressive power. For instance, the degree of specificity achievable via
agent-based models is higher than that achievable via differential equations
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and therefore agent-based models might be preferred in biology-related dis-
ciplines, despite the lack of analytical results. In other contexts, for reasons
of analytical tractability, differential equations are preferred to difference
equations, despite the inaccuracy that certain theoretical assumptions might
impose on a model, such as that population size is continuous (Colyvan 2013).
Similar examples of assumptions introduced for tractability reasons can be
found across domains. For instance, classical logic allows that propositions
take only two truth values, even if uncertainty and vagueness are standard
properties of our statements. In Bayesian epistemology, degrees of belief are
represented as probabilities, mainly for the flexibility and formal simplicity
of the probability calculus (Hartmann and Sprenger 2010).4
Notice that representational robustness must be distinguished from ro-
bustness to equivalent or isomorphic mathematical structures. The examples
given above illustrate that here we are dealing with models whose mathemat-
ical structures describe a certain phenomenon with different degrees of speci-
ficity. We are not exploring cases where different mathematical approaches
can describe the same objects or equivalent properties of different objects.
Representational robustness is thus similar to structural robustness, with the
main difference being that, in the former, the variations of interest concern
the models’ mathematical assumptions, which in turn reflect different as-
pects of the system under consideration, rather than the variables of a model
whose main structure remains fixed.
In a paper on robustness analysis, Kuorikoski et al. (2010) claim that also
in economic modeling it is standard to adopt assumptions with the purpose
of facilitating the mathematical tractability of a model, even if the simplifi-
cations these assumptions introduce do not literally mirror the phenomenon
under scrutiny. This a matter of interest for robustness analysis, insofar as
it asks whether and under what conditions we should expect that alternative
4It might be asked whether the distinction between representational and structural
robustness cannot be always traced back to differences in the structure of the initial model.
In other words, given that, if a certain assumption is replaced, there are corresponding
changes in the parameters of the model, why isn’t representational robustness a case of
structural robustness? The reason is that structural robustness - rather than investigating
the role of different parameters in a model with respect to the target system - focuses
on the role of the mathematical assumptions adopted to address a certain problem. It
is the purpose of representational robustness to consider the conditions under which we
are justified to adopt less accurate assumptions in all those cases where, for reasons of
mathematical tractability, we are not in a position to adopt more accurate ones, as the
example of the discontinuos functions for continuos cases show.
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mathematical assumptions will produce consistent results.
To address this issue, I will follow the analysis provided by Kuorikoski
et al. (2010). The case study discussed in their paper refers to a model in
economic geography, which is a sub-field of economics that investigates the
conditions under which an economic activity agglomerates in a certain region
as against the conditions under which it disperses. Since its first formulation
by Krugman (1991), the model of this phenomenon, known as the Core-
Periphery model, has been analyzed under different assumptions, such as
different transport costs and different utility functions.
The purpose of the analysis is to observe which properties break down
under different specifications and which ones are robust, even if all the as-
sumptions considered, whether about individuals’ utility functions, or trans-
port costs, are unrealistic assumptions. In this respect, robustness analysis
makes it possible to observe whether the results of a model strictly depend
on one of these false assumptions. If it does not, i.e. if the result is consistent
across them, then it might be because a real mechanism has been captured
across different formulations: “That the same results obtain with alterna-
tive specifications of transportation costs suggests that the results crucially
hinge not on the unrealistic assumption of iceberg transportation costs but
on the realistic substantial assumption that goods are costly to transport.”
(Kuorikoski et al. 2010, p. 557).
It might be asked why one should value the consistency of the derivation
across modalities if changes in the model’s assumptions mainly consist in
replacing falsities with other falsities. Even if the authors do not emphasize
it, the intuitive answer is that when economists conduct robustness analysis,
the goal is to replace certain assumptions with others, which are in a way less
false, in the sense that they provide a more realistic representation of the real-
world phenomenon. Thus, going back to Krugman’s example, the fact that
transport costs are relevant to the result is not the only aspect that should
interest the modelers. It is also important to identify how transport costs
change and in function of which variables, since this can affect the interplay
of centrifugal and centripetal forces in a relevant sense for the predictions of
the Core-Periphery model.
To see whether economists proceed in this way when conducting robust-
ness analysis, let us consider in more detail the case of the transport costs
function. The iceberg transport cost function (Samuelson 1952; Krugman
1991) is considered to be one of the major innovations in economic geog-
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raphy, whose introduction was crucial to determine a paradigm shift from
previous theories of international trade. The function is so called because it
is based on the principle that part of the goods melts away when transferred
from the place of production to the place of delivery. Even if the iceberg
formulation is evidently a theoretical construct, not based on direct observa-
tion, still it is considered to be appropriate mainly for two reasons: first, it
reflects the idea that goods are costly to transport; secondly, it enables the
formulation of transport factors not as a separate component of the model
but as part of the goods itself. In the words of Krugman (1998): “In terms of
modeling convenience, there turns to be out a spectacular synergy between
[...] market structure and ‘iceberg’ transport costs: not only can one avoid
the need to model an additional industry, but because the transport cost be-
tween two locations is always a constant fraction of the free-on-board price,
the constant elasticity of demand is preserved” (p. 11).
Given that the iceberg cost function is highly idealized, in subsequent for-
mulations of the Core-Periphery model, economic geographers have tried to
measure how sensitive the predictions are to that assumption. As has been
pointed out, a number of unrealistic features follow from the iceberg cost
function McCann (2005). Above all, that the price of the delivered goods
increases exponentially with distance, with the implausible consequence that
the price of the goods might exceed the value of the goods for larger dis-
tances. A further problematic aspect is that the price of the delivered goods
increases more rapidly for more expensive goods. Kuorikoski et al. report
that in a subsequent study by Ottaviano (2002), the iceberg cost function
has been substituted with a linear one, without this invalidating the origi-
nal result. While a linear function can solve the problem of different growth
rates according to different initial prices, it does not similarly solve the one of
exponential growth with distance. However, if the latter aspect also affects
the dynamics of the Core-Periphery model, then it has to be shown that the
predictions of the model are preserved even under functions that do not show
the same controversial aspects. I do not claim that it is not possible to come
up with such explanation, but that such explanation needs to be given to mo-
tivate robustness analysis in a meaningful way. Moreover, this is the aspect
that has to be highlighted in order to justify robustness analysis. If not, the
method is prone to the criticism, raised by many writers (see Odenbaugh and
Alexandrova 2011), that replacing idealized assumptions with other idealized
ones does not prove anything relevant with respect to the phenomenon under
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study.
The main problem seems to be that the functions that differ from the
iceberg one, in not showing the same controversial properties, are difficult to
implement in the Core-Periphery model. According to McCann (2005), “It
is almost impossible to provide direct comparisons between models with the
iceberg assumption and those with other sets of transport costs assumptions
embedded in them. [...] This is because these more traditional transport
costs functions are analytically incompatible with new economic geography
models” (p. 312). One of the reasons why the iceberg cost function was
initially introduced was indeed to facilitate the mathematical tractability of
a certain problem. If it were possible to adopt a more accurate transport
cost function, this would have been done from the beginning.
An analogy from physics, discussed by Hindriks (2006), illustrates this
point. In classical mechanics, when Newton first determined the orbit of
the planets around the sun, he assumed that there were no interplanetary
gravitational forces but only the attraction exerted between the sun and each
single planet. Even if this simplification was not justifiable on the basis of
the negligible effects of interplanetary attraction, still it was necessary for
reasons of mathematical tractability. Only later on, thanks to advancements
in mathematics, it became possible to introduce interplanetary attraction
into the calculation and to redefine the theory on that basis. This is to
say that the replacement of tractability assumptions with new ones might
require developments in mathematics that were not immediately available at
the time when the model was first formulated.
In economics, the problem is compelling as well, since economic models
also tend to have a particularly elaborate formal structure. The way in which
a certain assumption is introduced into a model also depends on the role it
plays in relation to the other components of the model. The Lotka-Volterra
model – where consistent results have been achieved both via differential
equations and via agent-based models – is a successful case, but it is also
a fortunate one, given that it is fairly uncontroversial how to interpret the
results deriving from the different mathematical assumptions at the basis of
each approach. Similarly, there are other cases where tractability assump-
tions have been introduced to approximate solutions to problems that could
not be solved analytically. As an example, consider the case of numerical
methods in solving differential equations. By contrast, and as the Core-
Periphery model shows, it is plausible to expect that, in economics, a more
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common situation is one in which – if a certain solution has been derived
under a specific tractability assumption – it is not straightforward to relax
that assumption and to solve the model under different conditions.
Therefore, even if the role of tractability assumptions is crucial in model
building, often it is not innocuous for the final predictions. Ideally, tractabil-
ity assumptions should be replaced with different ones, which do not have
the same controversial properties. Yet, as we have seen, it is not trivial to
exchange one assumption with another, especially if they were introduced
partly for the purpose of satisfying certain analytical requirements dictated
by the formal structure of the model. That is, the difficulties in replacing
tractability assumptions with new ones have to do with the reasons why they
were initially adopted. In this case, other options have to be considered. One
way is to identify – if possible – where the predictions of a certain function di-
verge from the real-world phenomenon and then to consider only those results
that derive under certain regimes. For example, in the case of the transport
cost function, given that problems mainly arise for greater distances, only
the solutions for short distances should be accepted. Often, however, it is
not even possible to quantify the possible errors related to the adoption of
certain mathematical simplifications. In these cases, as Newton’s example
shows, the problem is that of conceiving new mathematical methods that
make it possible to eliminate the simplifications of the previous treatments.
An alternative possibility is to compare the results of models that rely on dif-
ferent assumptions. However, even this move is not free of difficulties. Above
all, if every model is based on assumptions that are only partially plausible,
it is not clear which is the model whose predictions should be favored.
To conclude, the main point of this section is that even if in princi-
ple robustness analysis is a justifiable method of addressing the issue of
tractability assumptions in theoretical models, still it is far from being clear
how to proceed in order to conduct it, and especially with models where
tractability assumptions are introduced to solve nontrivial analytical prob-
lems. Whereas adding variables to a model is a less controversial procedure,
replacing tractability assumptions with different ones is not similarly un-
complicated and a number of difficulties emerge when trying to provide a
methodological account that regulates this practice.5
5This claim is not meant to suggest that the validity of robustness analysis has been
definitively proved, but that, for that analysis to be a viable option, different models
should provide comparable outcomes, which is often not the case in scientific practice. I
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Compare the robustness analysis of scientific models with the analysis con-
ducted in a laboratory experiment. In the latter, in order to test whether
the relation under observation is the effect of some possible confounders,
scientists try to disturb that relation, through changes in the experimental
setting. The variations they introduce in the experimental setup represent
modifications of the situation in which the event under scrutiny takes place,
which might influence its occurrence. In the same spirit, when dealing with
theoretical models, scientists analyze whether the predictions are stable de-
spite perturbations in the assumptions of the models. Whereas changes in
the experimental setup correspond to variations in the actual mechanism
that might affect the phenomenon under consideration, changes in the as-
sumptions of a model intervene on its theoretical structure.
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the notion of robustness anal-
ysis in scientific practice and to spell out the details of the procedure. A
distinction has been explored between different theoretical assumptions, ac-
cording to the role they play in the derivations of the model. Following
Weisberg’s classification (2008), this distinction is between assumptions that
concern changes in the system under observation, and assumptions chang-
ing the formal description of a phenomenon. In the two cases, scientists are
aiming at different goals: when changing the variables of the models, the
goal is to observe whether a certain relation is robust to the introduction
of other variables. When changing the formal approach, the intention is to
assess the impact of the assumptions introduced for reasons of mathematical
tractability, since the result of a model should not depend on the specifics of
the structure adopted in order to make the derivation possible.
In the paper Economic Modelling as Robustness Analysis, (Kuorikoski et
al. 2010) claim that robustness analysis plays an essential role in economics
and that the method is crucial to increase explanatory and predictive power
and to drive progress in their discipline. As evidence for this, they report
suggest, therefore, that it is more urgent to provide a method to deal with those cases
where the outcome of different analyses are not easily comparable with one another, rather
than debating how to deal with a rather uncommon circumstance. However, I realize that
the exploration of one single case study from economic geography, despite its role as a
gold standard in the relevant literature, is not conclusive for a more general claim on the
status of robustness analysis. Other case studies need to be considered from the literature
in support of or against the position defended here.
Chapter 5. Towards a methodological account of robustness analysis 93
how it is often enough for economists to prove that the predictions of a
model are not robust under modifications of some of the initial assumptions,
for example full rationality, to have a publication in a prestigious economic
journal. Not surprisingly, criticisms of robustness analysis have been taken
seriously as potentially undermining the basis of economic methodology. As
shown in the first part of this chapter, a lively debate has ensued in the
scientific community in reaction to these critiques.
Overall, I have argued that robustness analysis, in the various senses at-
tributed to it, is in principle a useful method of testing the validity of the
predictions of a model. In this respect, if scientific models yield informa-
tive predictions, it is also due to robustness analysis, insofar as the method
provides a way of securing the predictions of the models. However, several
issues have been pointed out that need to be addressed in order to regulate
the practice of robustness analysis. Attention has been called in particular
to problems related to the robustness analysis of tractability assumptions.
I have not focused on the analogous issues of structural robustness and pa-
rameter robustness, not because I regard them as insignificant, but mainly
because it has been urged by several authors (Cartwright 2005; Kuorikoski
et al. 2010) that the impact of tractability assumptions requires a systematic
analysis, which is still missing in the philosophy of economics literature.
By means of a case study in economic geography, I have explained that
tractability assumptions are adopted chiefly for mathematical reasons, but
that their introduction is not necessarily harmless for the predictions of the
models. It is only under specific circumstances that the results of a model
are not criticizable because they were derived under certain mathematical
simplifications. When it is not possible to quantify the errors that tractability
assumptions entail, the question of how to proceed in order to evaluate the
predictions of a model is far from being straightforward.
The strategy of robustness analysis is to replace tractability assumptions
with different ones. However, often for the same reason these assumptions
were introduced in the first place, it is difficult to adopt new ones without
compromising the overall structure of the model. This is especially the case
with economic models that have a complex structure. An alternative strategy
is to contrast the results of models relying on different initial assumptions.
Yet, there is no obvious reason to expect that the results of different mod-
els can be easily compared with each other. Just as different experimental
practices might lead to different results, thereby posing the question of how
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to interpret these results (Stegenga 2009), the same is true of inconsistent
predictions deriving from models with different initial assumptions. Prob-
ably, the standard situation in economics is not one where the predictions
are stable across conditions, but where different results stem from different
analyses, so that one should adopt a cautious attitude to the results. In
conclusion, rather than trying to debunk the role of robustness analysis as a
general method of assessing the predictions of scientific models, this chapter
has tried to highlight the difficulties encountered in the practice of robustness
analysis, and to indicate where effective strategies need to be developed in




In conclusion, let us first return to the questions posed at the beginning
of this study, summarize the main findings and finally point to directions
for further research. The major thread running through this thesis is the
emergence of norms in society and norms compliance. To address these
issues, a family of formal and experimental methods have been adopted,
followed by a methodological reflection on robustness analysis.
More specifically: In chapter 2, I have presented an agent-based model
of a descriptive norm, which is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when
their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. An
account of the emergence of descriptive norms has been provided by first
looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We have then examined
the structure of the standing ovation, and showed that it can be generalized
to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
Chapter 3 has dealt with a mathematical model for the emergence of
descriptive norms, where the individual decision problem is formalized with
the standard Bayesian belief revision machinery. Whereas in the previous
study the emergence of descriptive norms relied on heuristic modeling, a
Bayesian model has provided a more general picture of the emergence of
norms and clarified the assumptions made in heuristic models. In this model,
the priors formalize the belief that the behavioral rule is a descriptive norm;
the evidence is provided by other group members’ behavior and the likelihood
by their reliability. We have implemented the model in a series of computer
simulations and examined the group-level outcomes. We have claimed that
domain-general belief revision helps explain why we look for regularities in
social life in the first place.
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Chapter 4 has addressed the question of how other people’s opinion af-
fects judgments of norm transgressions. A modification of the Asch paradigm
(1951, 1955) has been adopted to examine conformity in the moral domain.
We have asked how peer group opinion alters normative judgments of scenar-
ios involving violations of moral, social, and decency norms. The results have
indicated that a norm taxonomy can be based on the insulation of different
kinds of norm from other people’s beliefs and preferences, even if all kinds of
norm are prone to some extent to social pressure.
In chapter 5, I have examined the epistemic validity of robustness anal-
ysis, as a method of testing whether the predictions of a model are the
unintended effect of the initial unrealistic assumptions. In this final chap-
ter, I have argued that even if in principle scientific theories do gain support
from robustness analysis, still it is a fortunate case in which the results of
different investigations can be compared with one another, and especially if
models have a complicated structure and rely on several assumptions. In
these cases, a way has to be found to interpret different results as an alter-
native to suspending judgment. Despite the restriction of its applicability
to a limited domain, I have acknowledged robustness analysis as a valuable
practice inherent in model building and designing experiments.
Altogether, the projects I have undertaken are part of a broad research
program that explores the nature and dynamics of decision-making as medi-
ated by norms. Overall, the mechanisms behind norms compliance involve
a large variety of factors, the most important of which are as follows: social
representations, social learning, moral reasoning, emotional responses and
cultural and anthropological contexts. To address them, contributions from
different branches of the humanities and the sciences are needed. It would
be näıve even to try to offer an exhaustive account of the subject matter,
and this study only covers some facets of the story. The attempt made here
has been to address at least some of the key features of the decision-making
processes, where individual action, emotions and cognition overlap in a way
that might be conducive to the emergence of a new norm.
In this respect, each of the first two chapters of this thesis has provided a
general model for the emergence of norms, the one describing the structure
of individuals’ preferences underlying the decision to comply with a norm,
the other the cognitive apparatus that sustains normative behavior. Both are
explanatory templates capable of further development into more complex and
realistic representations. By virtue of their simplicity and generality, these
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models are analogous to the original segregation model by Schelling; and like
Schelling’s model, they are adequate to subsume a large class of phenomena,
but can progressively be enriched with more complex and realistic elements.
In future works, I plan to extend both the heuristic and the rational model
to a larger normative domain. In particular, a question that the present work
leaves open is how to model normative behaviors that involve higher-level
expectations, as in the case of social and moral norms. This leads in turn
to the question of how normative expectations emerge in the first place. I
consider it important to test the predictions of models not only via computer
simulations, but also via laboratory experiments, such as the one presented
in the third chapter. The experimental study in that chapter, on conformity
and normative judgment, pairs with the two previous models, insofar as it
constitutes a first step in the direction of a more fine-grained taxonomy of
norms.
It is noteworthy that the formal and experimental approaches I have used
throughout this thesis reflect a methodological trend in several areas of phi-
losophy. This way of tackling philosophical problems brings philosophy closer
to the sciences. What is standard practice in scientific laboratories, where
researchers with diverse skills and expertise collaborate on joint projects, is
also being adopted in the philosophical world. Collaborative work in phi-
losophy is essential, both for the division of labour and so that researchers
can become acquainted with those practices that are not part of their own
background. It is important to bear in mind that this shift has a significant
impact on research time. It takes time to learn methods for the conduct of
formal and experimental research. Designing experiments, collecting data,
re-collecting data to test for possible confounders, writing computer codes
and running simulations, are activities that usually span several semesters.
These activities lead to the writing of papers, which are in many respects
distant from philosophical works in the classical sense, and where the bound-
aries between philosophy and the sciences become blurred.
Nevertheless, the role of the philosopher in this domain of inquiry is not
marginal. This research lies at the intersection of classic philosophical topics
such as reasoning, volition and action. Moreover, a study on normative
behavior needs to be supported by an ethical analysis that has as its central
core the fundamentals of morality, and the distinction between what is right
and wrong. In the course of this study, I have mentioned how awareness of
the mechanisms of norms compliance might induce pro-social behaviors and
98
help to dismiss negative norms. To be sure, there are a number of clear-cut
cases in which it is evident that the norms under consideration are harmful
for the individuals – extreme examples are child marriages or female genital
mutilation in African societies. Yet, in many circumstances it is a matter of
dispute how to assess whether a norm is positive or negative in content. In
this respect, it pertains to the ethicist to guide the debate concerning the
evaluative assessment of the norms we live by. We are continually witnessing
how dramatic can be those processes of change in norms, where conduct
that was considered to be right (or wrong) according to previous standards
of behavior, ceases to be such and becomes the expression of new values in
society.
To conclude, the studies I have presented in this thesis are the outcome
of some of the projects I have undertaken during the years of my PhD at
Tilburg University and at the Ludwig Maximilians University Munich. Each
of them can be seen as a continuation of the previous one, originally intended
to consider the questions left open by the previous study, but afterwards
extended to its own domain. Together, they represent the philosophical and
experimental journey that has preoccupied me until now, and that began with
the intention to learn the trade of formal models, simulations and experiments
in order to apply them to a philosophical investigation.
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